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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF MATERNAL CONVERSATION IN CHILDREN’S SOCIAL
UNDERSTANDING DURING MIDDLE CHILDHOOD
RaeAnne Morgan Pearson, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois University, 2015
Bradford Pillow, Director
This dissertation examines the relationship between maternal speech and children’s
social understanding during middle childhood. Research has demonstrated a relationship
between maternal speech and children’s social understanding during early childhood, but
research has not examined the link among older children. Accordingly, the purpose of this
study is to identify whether maternal speech is related to advancements in social understanding
during middle childhood as well as how maternal speech relates to children’s age and gender.
Participants were 38 mother–child pairs. Child participants were divided into a younger
group of 11 males and 9 females (M = 5 years, 11.5 months; range: 5 years to 7 years) and an
older group of 10 males and 8 females (M = 9 years, 3 months; range: 7 years, 10 months to 10
years, 9 months). Children completed two measures of social understanding and the Peabody
Picture Vocabulary Test. Together, mothers and children were asked to read and discuss four
stories involving different social dilemmas. Results indicated that compared to the younger
group, the older group a) performed better on both measures of social understanding, b) had
more instances of basic mental talk (i.e., talk about beliefs, emotions, personality traits, and
desires), and c) had more instances of advanced mental talk (i.e., talk about contrasting
perspectives, recursion and relationship between mental states, and advanced emotions).
Mothers of older children had more instances of both basic and advanced mental talk. Mothers’

advanced mental talk was a unique predictor of children’s social understanding and children’s
advanced mental talk. No effects for gender were found. Results are discussed from a sociocultural perspective.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

An important topic in developmental psychology is the emergence of children’s theory
of mind. A broad definition of this term includes an understanding of how the mind works
(e.g., memory, perception, and attention) and the causes of behavior (e.g., desires, beliefs,
traits, and external causes). Much of this literature has focused on children’s theory of mind
before the age of five years. In particular, research has examined whether infants and young
children attribute people’s behavior to internal mental states. Consequently, our understanding
of the processes and changes involved in the development of a mature theory of mind is
limited beyond the age of five (see Miller, 2012, for a review). Many questions remain to be
answered. For example, how do children’s earlier competencies relate to their later
competencies? How do children’s achievements in one area of understanding relate to
achievements in other areas (e.g., how does children’s understanding of the stability and
individual differences in personality traits relate to their understanding of diversity of
perspectives)? Do biological and social processes have different roles in early versus later
development?
This study examines the relationship between the development of children’s social
understanding and children’s social interactions. That is, how do children and their parents
talk about the mind during middle childhood (i.e., 6- to 10-years-old) and how do these
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conversations relate to individual differences in children’s social understanding? In the
current study, social understanding includes understanding that people act in accordance with
their internal states, and also includes recognizing and coordinating multiple perspectives on
the same situation, understanding relationships among mental states, and understanding
complex personality traits.
Middle childhood is an appropriate age to consider individual differences in social
understanding as several advancements are made during this period. For example, during
middle childhood, children show awareness that other people can be the source of a person’s
beliefs (e.g., Perner & Wimmer, 1985), demonstrate more complex and nuanced
understanding of traits (e.g., Gonzalez, Zosuls, & Ruble, 2010; Gnepp & Chilamkurti, 1988),
and begin reasoning about people’s behaviors in more complex ways, including
understanding that beliefs, emotions, and desires are interconnected (e.g., Banerjee &
Watling, 2005; Bosacki, 2000; Bosacki, & Astington, 1999; Happé, 1994). Additionally,
Miller (2012) proposed that individual differences are likely to be more marked in middle and
late childhood than in early childhood. That is, children are likely to show pronounced
differences in the age at which they acquire higher forms of social understanding, how well
they are able to use this knowledge, and the overall nature of their social understanding (e.g.,
individual differences in the typical pattern of attributes they make).
Conversations are an appropriate means for studying children’s social understanding
as the conversations that they construct likely reflect their social understanding and reasoning.
Negotiating conversations with others may also lead to new social understanding (Bruner,
1986). Thus, the relationship between children’s social understanding and their conversations
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is most likely bidirectional. Specifically, a child’s emerging social understanding likely
influences the conversations children have with others and in return these conversations likely
influence the child’s social understanding. This relationship between social understanding
and language is supported by research guided by a socio-cultural perspective. Research with
young children has demonstrated a strong relationship between individual differences in
social understanding and variations in young children’s social interactions and language (e.g,
Brown, Donelan-McCall, & Dunn, 1996; Brown & Dunn, 1991; Cutting & Dunn, 2006;
Dunn, 1996; Dunn, Bretherton, & Munn, 1987; Lewis, Freeman, Kyriakidou, & Berridge,
1996). The current study is designed to explore whether this there continues to be a
relationship between children’s social understanding and their social interactions among older
children.
To summarize, we know much about how young children talk about the mind and how
their social world influences young children’s social understanding. We know much less
about how older children talk about the mind and how their social world influences their
social understanding. The goal of this empirical investigation is to assess individual
differences in parent-child conversations and how those differences are related to child
characteristics such as age, gender, and social understanding. In the following literature
review, I begin by reviewing advancements in children’s social understanding during middle
childhood. The purpose of this section is to identify the knowledge that children acquire
during middle childhood and how it differs from earlier knowledge. Next, I review literature
on the social processes associated with children’s social understanding. The purpose of this
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section is to describe the theoretical and empirical research that supports the hypothesis that
the development of children’s social understanding is influenced by social interactions.
Advancements in Theory of Mind during Middle Childhood

There is a long history in developmental psychology of asking how children make
sense of their social world. Within this area of study, there has been a focus upon the
understanding of first-order beliefs among 3- and 4-year-olds. During the preschool period
children are said to acquire a representational understanding of the mind as demonstrated by
understanding a false belief (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In a typical false belief task, the child
is introduced to a character, Maxi, and then told that Maxi has a piece of chocolate that he
places in the cabinet. Once Maxi leaves, a second character enters the room and moves the
chocolate to another cabinet. The test question is, “where will Maxi look for the chocolate?”
Three-year-olds typically say that Maxi will look in the new location, whereas 4- and 5-yearolds typically say that Maxi will look in the old location. These results have been interpreted
as evidence that most children acquire a representational understanding of the mind around
ages 4 or 5.
Beyond these well accepted findings, there is ongoing debate about whether
improvements in children’s understanding of the mind after they have acquired a
representational understanding of the mind, reflects conceptual change or improved
information processing. Some theorists (e.g., Perner, 1991; Sullivan, Zaitchik, & TagerFlusberg, 1994) have proposed that the difference between a child’s understanding of the
mind and an adult’s understanding of the mind is merely quantitative, not qualitative. That is,
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once children have acquired a representational understanding of the mind, they only have to
become better at using it. In contrast, others (e.g., Chandler, 2001) have argued that there are
qualitative differences between a 5-year-old who understands representation and an adult
(Hala & Carpendale, 1997). These theorists have also criticized the field for focusing too
much on this one achievement (e.g., Chandler, 2001). Chandler argues that a “one-miracle”
view of social understanding is anti-developmental and inappropriate since even older
children lack a mature understanding of the mind. Children do not acquire all necessary
concepts of an adult theory of mind in one step. Below, I discuss evidence that children still
have much to learn, beyond the existence of false beliefs, en route to a mature social
understanding. The evidence I present comes from research on the development of (a)
recursive thought, (b) understanding complex social scenarios, (c) constructivist or
interpretative theory of mind, and (d) trait attribution (see Miller, 2012 for a fuller review).
Second-Order Mental States: Recursive Thought

Children’s understanding of false belief is an example of understanding first-order
beliefs, which are beliefs about the world (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In contrast, secondorder beliefs are beliefs about other people’s beliefs. Like the first-order false belief task, a
common second-order false belief task involves children hearing a hypothetical story. In the
original study (Perner & Wimmer, 1985), John and Mary are at a park when an ice cream
truck arrives. Mary does not have money for ice cream and goes home to find money while
John stays at the park. In Mary’s absence, John learns that the ice cream truck will be moving
to the church to sell ice cream. Unbeknownst to John, Mary sees the ice cream truck and also
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learns that the ice cream truck will be moving to a second park and follows the truck there.
Finally, John comes to find Mary and learns that Mary has already gone to get ice cream. The
test question is, “where will John look for Mary?” Using memory prompts, some 6-year-olds
recognize that John would look in the park—the last place John thought Mary saw the ice
cream truck—though 4-year-olds consistently do not.
These results have been interpreted as evidence that children who pass second-order
belief tasks have a representational understanding of beliefs and are capable of recursive
thought (Perner, 1988). However, as mentioned, one issue is whether the difference in age
between mastery of first-order belief tasks compared to second-order belief tasks indicate a
conceptual change— specifically, the debate has been whether second- order belief
understanding is qualitatively different from first-order belief understanding (the conceptual
change position), or whether second-order tasks simply require more strenuous mental
processing that younger children are not yet capable of performing (the complexity-only
position) (Miller, 2009).
In support of the complexity-only position, Sullivan et al. (1994) argued that
information-processing demands explained children’s performance in Perner’s and Wimmer’s
second-order belief task. To support this position, Sullivan et al. took a number of steps to
reduce the processing demands of the task. These steps included shortening the stories, having
an experimenter, rather than a tape recorder, present the stories, continuously probing the
child throughout the stories, and giving children feedback on their responses to probe
questions. With these changes, 90% of 5 ½ year-olds and 40% of preschoolers could attribute
second-order beliefs. Sullivan et al. concluded that no additional conceptual change beyond
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understanding mental representation is needed for second-order reasoning. Rather,
“preschoolers have the same conceptual capacity for recursively embedding mental states as
do older children” (pg. 401) and only information-processing demands stand in the way of
children exhibiting this understanding. However, although Sullivan et al. found earlier
competence than did Perner and Wimmer, no other study has found competence as early as
Sullivan et al. (see Miller, 2009 for review). Furthermore, even Sullivan et al.’s results
showed that children still find first-order beliefs easier than second-order beliefs as
demonstrated by lingering difference in age of success on each task. Nevertheless, an age
difference in performance is not sufficient to determine whether conceptual change is
responsible for the performance differences (Miller, 2009).
Although information processing demands (domain general skills) presumably do play
a role in children’s comprehension of social events and participation in social interactions,
domain specific skills in mentalizing also continue to develop in later childhood as much
research suggests. In many cases, the problem with studying children’s earliest competencies
at a task (e.g., Sullivan et al., 1994) is that it only demonstrates children’s initial level of
understanding as assessed with minimally demanding tasks (Miller, 2012). Examining
performance in more demanding tasks and situations is necessary to get a more complete
picture of development. For example, studies that use complex social scenario tasks (see next
section) with control stories and questions to assess children’s general information processing,
have demonstrated that children’s failures on these tasks are due to their social reasoning
rather than their general information processing (e.g., White, Hill, Happé, & Frith, 2009).
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Complex Social Scenarios

Several researchers have designed theory of mind tasks that assess an advanced theory
of mind (e.g., Happe, 1994; Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999). These
tasks require children to reason about the beliefs, intentions, and feelings of multiple
characters and about possible outcomes of various social scenarios. Most of these tasks have
been developed to investigate theory of mind in children with autism, rather than the
development of social understanding, in general. These tasks are considered advanced tasks
because children do not generally pass them until they are older (i.e., between the ages of 7
and 9), and higher functioning children with autism who can pass first- and second- order
false belief tasks continue to find these tasks difficult. The implication is that these tasks
require more than second- order false belief understanding. However, it is unclear what
connects these tasks and what specific skills or concepts children must possess to pass them.
Some studies (e.g., Banerjee, 2000; Botting & Conti-Ramsden, 2008; Speck, Scholte, & Van
Beckelear-Onees, 2010) have found correlations among these tasks, while others have not
(e.g., Ahmed & Miller 2011; Hayward, 2011).
Commonly, these tasks involve children hearing hypothetical stories and then
answering questions about the character’s beliefs, intentions, knowledge, or feelings. For
example, Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) read children several instances of a social faux pas (i.e., a
social situation in which an actor’s ignorance or false belief leads them to say an insulting
comment to a victim). In one story, Sally (the victim) is visiting her aunt when the neighbor,
Mary (actor), comes over. After looking at Sally, Mary says, “Oh, I don’t think I’ve met this
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little boy. What’s your name?” To understand this event the observer (i.e., the child) must
represent the actor’s false belief and coordinate the actor’s belief with the victim’s emotional
response to the actor’s belief (“Mary thinks I look like a boy”). After hearing the story,
children are then asked whether someone said something they should not have said and about
Mary’s beliefs. Performance improved with age, with eleven-year-olds outperforming 7- and
9-year-olds. However, not all tests rely on hypothetical situations. For example, Baron-Cohen
and colleagues (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001) have shown participants pictures of an actor’s
eye region and asked the participant to make judgments about the actor’s emotion. Again,
children’s performance improved with age, with ten-year-olds outperforming 6- and 8-yearolds. Performance on the “eye test” has been found to correlate with performance on story
tasks (e.g., Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001) suggesting they depend on similar skills.
As mentioned earlier, most of these studies use normally developing children as
control groups only and present the task as a measure of naturalistic or advanced theory of
mind. As such, it remains unclear what skills these tasks assess and how theorists can explain
children’s development in relation to earlier social understanding. Mature social cognition
depends on a whole host of underlying skills: perspective taking, inferences, language,
coordinating mental states, socio-moral evaluations, emotions, recognizing social norms or
context, considering alternatives, executive functioning, and so on. Future research is needed
to identify what mature social understanding is, and what aspects of social understanding
these advanced theory of mind tasks actually measure. Specifically, researchers need to
determine the precise skills and concepts necessary to perform a task (e.g., perspective taking,
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coordinating evidence, constructivist theory of mind) and the developmental trajectory of
these skills. This study should help as one aspect of the current study is to examine how
children’s performance on higher order tasks relates to individual differences in the child’s
language, discourse, gender, and age.
Interpretive Theory of Mind

One proposed qualitative difference between younger and older children is an
understanding of the interpretive theory of mind. Carpendale and Chandler (1996) proposed
that an interpretive theory of mind is distinct from, and develops later than, false belief
understanding. An interpretive theory of mind is the awareness that two people can interpret
the same information in different ways. There are several tasks used to assess children’s
interpretive theory of mind. For example, children were introduced to two puppets and told
they were, “waiting for a ring.” One puppet was then described as waiting for a diamond
ring. The second puppet was described as waiting for a telephone ring. Children were
expected to justify the differences between the puppets’ interpretation of the message. In
another task, children were shown an ambiguous drawing that could be viewed as either a
duck or a rabbit. The two puppets both endorsed different interpretations. Again, children
were asked to justify the difference between the puppets’ interpretation. Only 7- and 8-yearolds seemed to master the interpretation questions. In contrast, 5-year-olds were only
competent at false belief questions—not the interpretation questions. This suggests that 5year-old children have not learned that two people looking at the same information can still
come up with different interpretations.

11

Along a similar line of reasoning, Pillow (1991) found that it was not until middle
childhood that children understand that other people can have different background
knowledge that causes them to interpret social behaviors differently. In this study, children
were presented with stories in which two observers witnessed an actor accidentally break a
victim’s toy (see Pillow, 1991 for additional variations). One observer liked the actor and one
observer disliked the actor. Children were then asked to identify and explain the actor’s
intentions. Kindergarteners had some understanding that the two observers would interpret the
actor’s actions differently. That is, the observer who did not like the actor would believe the
actor acted intentionally and the observer who liked the actor would believe the actor acted
accidentally. However, second graders performed much better and could justify their
responses. Pillow’s study is perhaps more relevant than Carpendale’s and Chandler’s study
with respect to the types of knowledge that is of interest herein as it is reflective of the kinds
of judgments that children typically make in their everyday life. Specifically, children are
likely making decisions about people that they have a past history with (e.g., knowing who
likes whom; or, how a person typically acts) and children are making judgments about other
children’s social behavior (Miller, 2012).
Similarly, Gnepp and Gould (1985) studied whether children could use past
experiences to make judgments about a person’s emotional reaction. For example, a child was
told a story in which an actor was bitten by a gerbil. Then, the child was asked how the actor
would respond when given the chance to later feed the gerbil. If the child reasoned only from
the immediate context, then the actor would be expected to feel happy. However, if the child
considered the past event then the actor should feel afraid. Coordinating past experiences with
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the current situation improved with age. Younger children had difficulty making inferences
from past behaviors and often used irrelevant or new information to explain the actor’s
emotion, whereas most 10-year-olds were successful when prompted.
This line of research suggests that throughout childhood, into adolescence (perhaps
even adulthood), a person’s understanding of the mind changes. They come to understand that
the mind is not passively receiving information but is instead actively constructing
information (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1985). For example, children realize that two people
can view the same information, or event, and interpret it differently and that people have
different biases (e.g., past experiences) that influence how they behave and their emotions.
Trait Attribution and Person Perception

Even preschool children talk about psychological causes of behavior and can use trait
terms (e.g., nice, good, and bad) in appropriate situations. However, this is not necessarily
evidence that preschoolers understand that personality traits are stable and that their
understanding of traits is as differentiated as older children (Miller & Aloise, 1984). In this
section, I describe children’s trait understanding as it develops between middle and late
childhood.
There is an important distinction between making inferences about people’s behaviors
from mental content (e.g., beliefs, desires) as compared to making inferences from traits—
traits are internal and stable. In contrast to adults, the developmental literature suggests that
young children can use traits but that only older children understand that traits are stable.
“Full dispositional conceptualization entails inferring an internal psychological characteristic
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and understanding its stability across time and situation in causing behavior” (Liu, Gelman, &
Wellman, 2007, pg. 1543). For example, Rholes and Ruble (1984) gave children video
examples of an actor exhibiting a particular behavior (e.g., generosity, athleticism) and then
asked children to make trait attributions and predictions regarding the likelihood of various
future events (e.g., generosity in a different context). The 5- and 6-year-olds could make
appropriate trait attributions, but only 8- and 9-year-olds made predictions across situations.
Interestingly, in a second study they found that younger children do not have trouble making
judgments about the consistency of the behavior over time in the same situation, but they did
have trouble making judgments about consistency of the behavior in different situations.
Since younger children made judgments of constancy across time but not across situations,
this suggests younger children were not making judgments based on dispositional
characteristics. In sum, this study indicates that children can think about people categorically
(traits) but that they do not fully use those traits to make judgments regarding the stability of
an individual’s behavior.
Other studies have found that, even when children appear to make stable dispositional
judgments, they may actually be relying on global evaluative judgments (Ruble & Dweck,
1995). For example, someone who shares can be thought of as being generous (trait) or as
being good (evaluation). Young children appear to rely on the latter. To test this hypothesis,
Alvarez, Ruble, and Bulger (2001) presented children with stories about an actor’s behaviors
that were representative of evaluative traits (generous—selfish) or non-evaluative traits
(brave-afraid). Traits were considered evaluative if they could be strongly associated with
“good” or “bad” and non-evaluative if they could not. After each vignette, children made
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predictive judgments (predictions of behavior in a different context), evaluative judgments
(good or bad), and trait judgments. Both Kindergarteners and 4th graders made appropriate
trait judgments, but the process of making predictions about future behaviors was different
between groups. Kindergarteners relied on evaluative judgments to make predictions. whereas
4th graders relied on trait judgments to make predictions.
Additionally, many studies have reported a ‘positivity bias’ among children (e.g.,
Boseovski & Lee, 2006; Rholes & Ruble, 1984; Stipek & Daniels, 1990). Into middle
childhood, children seem to disregard negative information about people and prefer to make
positive judgments about people’s abilities and traits.
Furthermore, studies that have looked at children’s descriptions of “what others are
like” suggest that younger children may be prone to thinking about people in terms of
behaviors and physical appearances, and only later describe people in terms of traits and
psychological qualities. As an example, Barenboim (1981) asked children to describe three
people that they knew and analyzed their descriptions in terms of behavioral comparisons
(e.g., “Jane runs faster than most girls”), psychological constructs (e.g., “She is so kind”), and
psychological comparisons (e.g., “He is more selfish than Tom”). Behavioral comparisons
were the most common until the age of 8 when psychological constructs became more
common. Psychological comparisons were least frequent but increased in occurrence during
late childhood and adolescence.
A number of explanations for the age-related changes in children’s person perception
have been proposed. For example, from a theory of mind perspective, Yuill and Pearson
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(1998) proposed that children cannot understand traits until they have a better understanding
of desires. Rholes and Ruble (1984) have suggested that the development of informationprocessing skills assists children in explaining the stability of other people’s behaviors.
Another possibility comes from data regarding the existence if cross-cultural differences.
Miller (1986) explored differences in trait attribution between Hindu and American children
and found that 8-year-olds in both groups tended to prefer external explanations for behaviors
and made few inferences. However, Hindu adults gave more context explanations, whereas
American adults gave more trait explanations. These results are consistent with other crosscultural differences in the adult literature (e.g., Morris & Peng, 1994). From a developmental
perspective, Miller’s results suggest that culture plays some role in the development of person
perception; however, developmental similarities between both groups of children suggest that
culture is not the exclusive cause. The importance of the cultural context is consistent with the
proposal that school context is an important contributor to children’s social cognitive
development (Higgins & Parsons, 1983). For example, children may learn about enduring
characteristics of people in their social world as the have more exposure to peers and have
more exposure to social comparisons.
Together, this evidence suggests that children have knowledge of traits and during
middle childhood children begin to understand that traits are internal and stable psychological
constructs that can be used to predict stability in a person’s behaviors.
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Social Processes of Social Understanding Development

As discussed in the last section, children’s social understanding continues to develop
throughout middle childhood, adolescence, and into adulthood. This is a much larger
developmental period than has been typically considered, even though most theorists would
agree that a 3-year-old has a much different conception of the mind than a 7-year-old or an
adult. Some clear changes happen in children’s social understanding during middle childhood.
Some of these differences have to do with acquiring new knowledge and mental skills while
other developmental changes are likely quantitative (Miller, 2012). Children become more
proficient at using their skills and applying their skills to new areas. Also, children’s
understanding of others’ mental world becomes more complex. The current investigation is
specifically interested in addressing the individual differences in the development of
children’s social understand and how it relates to characteristics of parent’s and child’s
conversational content. There is no reported research documenting instances of advanced
social cognition in conversation and, as such, this study is the first of its kind. Research has
shown that various aspects (e.g., mention of mental state) of young children’s conversations
with their parents is related to the development of their social understanding but research has
not explored whether older children’s conversations with their parents is related to the
development of their social understanding. In this chapter, first, I present several different
theoretical positions regarding the origins of children’s theory of mind. Second, I present the
empirical evidence that has documented the relationship between social interaction and the
development of children’s social understanding.
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Theoretical Background

For the past three decades, psychologists have been interested in the origins of
children’s theory of mind. During this period, three theories have been prominent- theory
theory, simulation theory, and modularity theory. More recently, socio-cultural theories have
become influential as evidence continues to demonstrate the importance of children’s social
world to their conceptual development (Astington, 1996). Briefly, I will summarize each of
these positions and then explain how theorists from each camp have explained the role of
social influences. Special emphasis is placed upon socio-cultural theories because they have
the most overlap with the current study.
Theory theory
The theory theorist’s position is a broad developmental perspective that sees much
similarity between general cognitive development and the development of scientific theories
(Gopnik, 1996; Gopnik, 2003). In the social domain, theory theorists propose that children
have a naïve theory regarding a person’s overt behavior and inner experiences (e.g., desires,
beliefs, emotions, and so on). The children’s theory of the mind would therefore consist of a
set of inter-related principles about the mind that explain the cause of behaviors. Using the
analogy from science, theory theorists propose that children’s theories continue to evolve as
children receive social data that may be inconsistent with their current theory. As children try
to explain these inconsistencies their old theories are revised or replaced (Gopnik, 1996). As
such, theory theorist argued that there is no difficulty in accounting for social influences in the
theory theory framework (Bartsch & Estes, 2004). Rather, children’s theories change as a
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result of their social experiences. For example, children can learn about false beliefs from
watching their parent search unsuccessfully for their keys; or, while trying to persuade their
parent to get a puppy, children can learn that it is best to appeal to the desires and beliefs of
the other person, rather than their own beliefs and desires (Bartsch & Estes).
Simulation theory

In contrast to theory theory, simulation theorists propose that children come to
understand the mind by running mental simulations rather than through forming theories
(Harris, 1991, 1992). This is not to suggest that there is no room for ‘theory’ in the simulation
theorist’s perspective, only that theorizing cannot fully account for the predictions a person
can make (Heal, 1996). A person does not need to sort through their psychological theories to
explain another person’s behavior. Instead, to explain or make predictions about other
people’s behaviors, a person can use their own mind to imagine or simulate another person’s
thoughts, emotions, and intentions (e.g., Heal). One only has to “imagine” why someone
might behave that way. As such, children’s participation in conversations, conflict, and
pretend play give children the opportunity to consider alternative minds and thus promotes
social cognitive development. As Harris (1996; 2006) points out, conversations with others
may be particularly important since children receive immediate feedback on their predictions
(i.e., simulation) and conversations give children the opportunity to take alternative or
contrasting perspectives. Harris also argues that children’s participation in pretense with
other children is another important avenue in which children can learn about the mind.
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Modularity theory

Finally, modularity theory is perhaps the most individualist and nativist of the three
dominant positions. Modularity theorists propose that children’s understanding of the mind is
innately given. Through the maturation of a proposed brain mechanism known as “Theory of
Mind Mechanism” (or, ToMM) children come to understand mental states (Leslie, 1994). It
is the ToMM mechanism that allows children to attend to and learn from social information
(German & Leslie, 2004). To explain the data regarding the relationship between social
influences and social understanding, German and Leslie suggest several explanations. For
example, the relationship between parental talk and children’s social understanding may be
the result of shared genetics. Also, the relationship between the number of siblings and
children’s social understanding may be the result of practice in mentalizing. Or finally,
children’s performance on false belief tasks may be the result of domain-general processes
(e.g., executive function, IQ). The modularity position is, perhaps, the position most at odds
with evidence of social influences on children’s developing theory of mind. In this
perspective, social stimuli triggers the brain mechanism responsible for understanding the
mind and it is unclear how social stimuli would advance children’s social understanding at
older ages.
Socio-cultural theories

Compared to other theories of children’s social understanding, interpersonal
interaction is considered a central tenet in socio-cultural theories. It is not simply a means for
data collection or a trigger for an innate module. Rather, socio-cultural theorists largely

20

assume that social understanding emerges out of the child’s interaction with the social world
(e.g., Dunn & Brophy, 2005; Fernyhough, 2008; Nelson, 2005). Learning is seen as a process
of internalizing social interactions. Many of the social cognition theorists espousing this
theoretical position have been heavily influenced by Vygotsky despite Vygotsky never
directly addressing children’s social understanding in his theories. Examples of Vygotsky’s
ideas that have been most productive in explaining the development of social understanding
include: internalization (of interpersonal exchanges), zone of proximal development, naïve
participation, semiotic systems (e.g., language) of mediation, and the dialogical nature of
higher cognition (see Fernyhough, 2008 for review). These are not single ideas but rather are
interrelated. The relationship between many of these concepts is illustrated in Rogoff’s (1990)
description of Vygotsky’s theories:
Central to Vygotsky’s theory is that children’s participation in cultural activities with
the guidance of more skilled partners allows children to internalize the tools for
thinking and for taking more mature approaches to problem solving that children have
practiced in social context. Cultural inventions channel the skills of each generation,
with individual development mediated by interaction with people who are more skilled
in the use of the culture’s tools. (pg. 14)
In this study, I hypothesize that children’s social understanding is guided by
experience with more competent members of their community. Vygotsky (1978; Rogoff,
1990) believed that learning first occurred on an interpersonal plane and then on an individual
psychological plane. That is, children first use concepts during interpersonal interactions and
later internalize these skills. Interaction with more competent participants such as adults, were
important in Vygotsky’s theory. During conversations or observing more competent partners,
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children can learn to take new perspectives, pick up vocabulary, and learn means of problem
solving that are beyond the child’s current level of competency. Parents and other adults
often have explicit goals of teaching children. As a result, they may use language that is
sensitive to the child’s competence level, guide conversations to specific goals, and use shared
common references. However, explicit goals are not necessary. Rather, many of the
conversations or actions that children are exposed to are not designed to explicitly teach
children, but these situations do inform children about cultural practices (Rogoff). For
example, Harris (2005) argued that the pragmatic intent of parents to introduce children to
different points of view in conversation was important for children’s social understanding.
During conversations parents often ask children to take on other people’s perspectives (e.g.,
“How would you feel if…”). Additionally, even when parents are not explicitly asking
children to take on another person’s perspective, conversational partners often set aside their
own perspective to consider their partner’s perspective.
Socio-cultural theorists’ also focus on the role of language in the development of
children’s social understanding (e.g., Astington & Baird, 2005; Carpendale & Lewis, 2004;
Meins et al., 2002; Nelson, 1996; 2004; 2005). Language is seen as a tool for which children
learn about contrasting perspectives (Harris, 1996), connect external referents to internal
referents (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Astington & Baird, 2005; Meins at al., 2002) and learn
agreed upon cultural values and ways of talking about behavior (Nelson 2004; 2005; Vinden,
2001). This role of language in children’s learning is likely to change with age. Young
children may demonstrate some immature understanding during conversation because of
social scaffolding. For example, it has been demonstrated that young children sometimes have
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different understanding of mental state terms than older children and adults even if they are
producing these terms in their conversations (e.g., Johnson & Maratsos, 1977; Moore, Bryant,
& Furrow, 1989). As children develop, and their cognitive and language proficiency increase
it is expected that children can learn and comprehend more from social exchanges, that their
participation within social exchanges becomes more active, and that the types of social
exchanges that children are involved in changes. Parents may also be more likely to expand
upon concepts or address more complex social events (e.g., morality, justice) with older
children than younger children (Nelson, 1996).
Finally, while socio-cultural theorists emphasize the importance of children’s
development in a social and cultural context, many of these theorists have also stressed the
role of the individual child from a constructivist perspective (e.g., Carpendale & Lewis, 2004;
Nelson, 1996; Tomasello, 1999). For example, Nelson (1996) argues that a child’s cognitive
development is, “not solved by the child alone, as in cognitive constructionism, or by the
social world or through social construction alone, but must be solved through a process of
collaborative constructionism, in which the child’s individual cognitive activity is as crucial
as the interaction with the knowing social world.” (pg.21, emphasis in original). Importantly,
social interaction alone cannot explain children’s social understanding. Rather children’s
interactions with more competent partners (e.g., parents) facilitate their development in this
area. However, children must individually internalize these interactions and bring their own
prior knowledge and participation to these interactions. Children’s role in these interactions
can facilitate, block, or change the message being communicated to the child (Rogoff, 1990).
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Empirical Support

As discussed socio-cultural theorists largely assume that social understanding emerges
out of the child’s interaction with other people (e.g., Dunn & Brophy,2005; Fernyhough,
2004; Nelson, 2005). Consistent with this perspective, parenting style (Hughes, DeaterDeckard, & Cutting, 1999; Pears & Moses, 2003; Ruffman, Perner, & Parkin, 1999), parental
relationship quality and attachment (Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, & Clark-Carter, 1998),
parental mental state talk (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Telsa, & Youngblade, 1991; Ruffman,
Slade, & Crowe, 2002; Slaughter, Peterson, & Mackintosh, 2007), presence of adult kin
(Lewis, Freeman, Kyriakidou, Berridge, 1996), and the number of siblings (Perner, Ruffman,
& Leekam, 1994) have each been shown to relate to individual differences in the child’s
understanding of the mind. Experience with other people’s mind (e.g., beliefs, desires,
perspectives), through conversations with other people or observation, appears to support
children’s acquisition of their culture’s folk theory of mind (i.e., understanding of mental
states and intentions) and the internalization of multiple perspectives. The empirical evidence
is discussed below.
The following review of empirical studies presents evidence that social interaction is
related to social understanding. The evidence comes from four areas of research: comparison
between deaf and hearing children, cross-cultural research, the effect of having siblings, and
individual differences in parenting practices. The review focuses on evidence of parental
influence on children’s social understanding because parental influence is the primary focus
of this study. In particular, the evidence presented suggests that parenting practices,
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attachment relationships, and the content of parent-child conversations are important
predictors of young children’s social cognitive development. This section will conclude with
research that child characteristics may moderate the relationship between children’s social
experience and their social understanding. The question that is addressed in the current study
is how child and parental characteristics are related to more advanced social cognitive
development during middle childhood?
Differences between deaf and hearing children

One way to study the influence of social interaction on children’s social understanding
is to observe children who may lack exposure to social interaction or may have delayed
exposure to social interaction. For example, several studies have found a delay in children’s
theory of mind performance in deaf children (e.g., Figueras-Costa & Harris, 2001; Peterson &
Siegal, 1995; Woolfe, Want, & Seigal, 2002). Interestingly, this delay seems to be the result
of when deaf children are exposed to language. That is, Woolfe, Want, and Siegal (2002)
assessed differences in theory of mind performance between native signers (i.e., those born to
deaf parents and were exposed to signing early) and late signers (i.e., those born to hearing
parents and exposed to signing outside the home). Both groups demonstrated a delay in theory
of mind understanding, but the late signers had significantly more delay compared to the
native signers. This difference remained even when controlled for spatial mental age and
language. This suggests that exposure and interaction with language facilitates the developing
of social understanding.
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Similarly, exposure to a culture’s vocabulary and grammar may affect social
understanding, such that those without exposure may think and communicate differently
about the mind. Most languages have evolved over hundreds of years or more and thus it is
difficult to speculate how the mind has been changed by language or shaped by the
conventions of a specific language (Tomasello, 1999). However, in the 1980s a new language
was formed, Nicaraguan Sign Language (NSL). Deaf children, who lacked a common sign
language, were brought together to attend school and, as a result, the children began creating a
unique language to communicate with each other. Over time the language continued to evolve
with each new generation of children. Therefore children in the second cohort learned a
modified version of the language that the children in the first cohort created. This allowed
researchers to observe differences between the originators of the language and new users.
Comparing adults from the first cohort with adolescents from the second cohort has
provided evidence that theory of mind understanding appears to be affected by the language
learned (Pyers, 2005). Both groups learned language prior to the age of 6 and both groups
were familiar with modern society, but adolescents from the second cohort learned a modified
version of the language. When the two groups were compared, adults who were among the
first cohort failed to understand a modified version of a false belief task and often ignored the
internal mental states of a character when asked to describe a scenario in which a character
makes a mistake that resulted from a false belief. In contrast, the adolescent signers, who were
among the second cohort, passed the false belief task and did refer to internal states when
describing the scenario. Researchers argued that that difference between the language learned
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by both groups, both vocabulary and grammar, influenced the emergence of the individual’s
theory of mind.
Cross-cultural differences

Cross-cultural research demonstrates that culture impacts the age when children pass
certain theory of mind tasks, as well as the content of children’s and adult’s social reasoning.
Some research has demonstrated dramatic cultural differences in the age at which
children pass socio-cognitive tasks (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). For example,
Vinden (1996) observed that the Junin Quechua adults in Peru generally left out mention of
beliefs and thinking in their conversations and storytelling but that appearance was generally
spoken about. Vinden hypothesized that the general lack of talk about beliefs and thinking
among adults may result in delays in children’s false belief understanding, but children would
not demonstrate delays in measures of appearance/reality distinctions since appearance was
referred to in their cultural language. This hypothesis was supported. Junin Quechua children
were likely to pass appearance/reality distinction questions, but even the oldest children (i.e.,
8-year-olds) were at chance on false belief questions. This is noteworthy since children from
western cultures generally pass false belief tasks between the ages of 4 to 5.
Further support comes from a second study by Vinden (1999), comparing theory of
mind performance of the Mofu of Camerooon, the Tolai and the Tainae of Papua New
Guinea, and a group of western children living in Papua New Guinea. Non-western children
had delays in answering false belief questions and answering questions about emotions that
were based on false beliefs about the world. Vinden theorized that some of the cross-cultural
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differences might be explained by schooling and cultural differences in the concept of
emotion or the causes of emotions.
However, understanding beliefs is only one aspect of theory of mind. Some additional
aspects of theory of mind include understanding emotions, beliefs, and desires. Evidence
suggests that these aspects of theory of mind are understood in a developmental sequence
(e.g, Pons, Lawson, Harris, & De Rosnay, 2003; Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & Liu, 2006;
Wellman & Liu, 2004). For example, children talk about desires before beliefs (Bartsch &
Wellman, 1995) and have more difficulty on hidden emotion tasks than false belief tasks (e.g.,
Wellman & Liu, 2004). While some evidence suggests that children from different cultural
backgrounds acquire some theory of mind concepts at different ages it may be that there is a
universal sequence for understanding these concepts. Comparing children from Beijing, China
with children from the United States and Australia, Wellman et al. found evidence for a
universal sequence. However, Chinese children consistently had earlier success on
knowledge-ignorance tasks than American and Australian children; whereas, American and
Australian children had earlier success on diverse-belief tasks than Chinese children. These
differences were thought to be the result of sociocultural differences. For example, in English
“think” and “believe” are used regardless of whether a belief is true or false; whereas, in
Chinese there is a verb specifically for “think falsely”. Additionally, Chinese parents often
spend more time talking about “knowing”, while U.S. parents emphasize “thinking” in their
conversations. Finally, Chinese children spend more time learning practical skills at home and
school than U.S. children (see Wellman et al., for review).
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Other studies have found that there may be within- and cross-cultural differences in
emotional scripts. Cole and colleagues (Cole & Tamang, 1998; Cole, Bruschi, & Tamang,
2002; Cole, Shrestha, & Tamang, 2006) have found individual differences in emotional
scripts related to parental practices, culture, and religious beliefs. For example, Cole and
colleagues asked children from two different groups in Nepal (i.e., Brahman and Tamang) and
the United States to explain their emotions and behaviors to emotionally charged situations
(e.g., unfair treatments by parents or peers). Typically, U.S. and Braham children responded
with anger. In contrast, the Tamang children often responded with shame or little emotion and
reported that they would not feel anger (e.g., “Why be angry?”) in situations that the U.S. and
Braham children reported causing anger (Cole, Bruschi, & Tamang, 2002). The withincultural differences between Braham and Tamang children was proposed to be a consequence
of differences in parental socialization, religious and culture values (e.g., Hindu vs.
Buddhism), and differences in class.
Effect of having siblings

Having siblings exposes children to more minds, resulting in more conversation and
more perspectives on a situation. Perner, Ruffman, and Leekam (1994) were some of the first
researchers to demonstrate that differences in children’s social context were related to
children’s theory of mind performance. Perner et al. found that having siblings had a
significant effect on children’s false belief performance. The difference in performance
between children who had two or more siblings and children who had no siblings was
comparable to the average difference in performance between 3-year-olds and 4-year-olds.
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However, these results should not be taken as evidence that simple exposure to other people’s
minds benefits children. Research with siblings demonstrates that the presence of siblings
enriches the child’s social environment but, the correlational nature of this data does not
explain what it is about siblings that benefit children’s social understanding. For example,
Dunn and colleagues (e.g., Dunn & Dale, 1984; Dunn, Bretherton, & Munn, 1987) have
argued that conversations with siblings evoked more creative play, maternal speech about
feelings, and reflections on motives and other mental states.
Further research has suggested that it is not merely the number of siblings but the age
of the siblings that matters to children’s social understanding. Peterson (2000) reported that
children who have either infant or adolescent siblings did not benefit from the “sibling effect”.
Rather, only children with siblings between the ages of 1 and 12 performed significantly
better than children without siblings. Another interesting finding is that children who have a
twin do not show advanced theory of mind performance (Cassidy, Fineberg, Brown, &
Perkins, 2005). Why does the chronological age of the sibling matter? One argument is that
children benefit from exposure to contrasting perspectives. Children with infant and
adolescent siblings may be less likely to interact with these siblings, and twins may fail to
benefit from their sibling because their sibling’s perspective may not vary enough from their
own (Cassidy et al., 2005). Likewise, Lewis and colleagues (Lewis, Freeman, Kyriakidou,
Maridaki-Kassotaki, & Berridge, 1996) found that children’s false belief performance was
significantly correlated with the number of older siblings and kin and the amount of daily
interaction with these family members. Lewis et al. argued that children benefit from
interacting with more advanced members of a culture (i.e., apprenticeship model). Research
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that has observed children’s conversation with siblings has supported this position and shown
that children with older siblings are exposed to more cognitive talk (i.e., words related to
knowledge, thought, and memories) than children with younger siblings (Jenkins, Turrell,
Kogushi, Lollis, & Ross, 2003).
While several studies have found an effect for siblings, other researchers have found
no relationship between the number of siblings and false belief performance (Cutting & Dunn,
1999). This discrepancy alerts one to several methodological and theoretical considerations.
Researchers need to be cautious in generalizing the sibling effect to subjects who are not from
white, middle to high SES, and highly educated backgrounds. Cutting and Dunn propose that
the quality of the sibling interaction or the relationship between siblings may be more
important than mere number of siblings.
Children’s relationships with siblings are unique from other types of interactions
because children do not choose their siblings, sibling relationships are likely to contain
hostility and conflict, there is a long shared history and knowledge, and children with siblings
are likely to witness conversation between parents and siblings, all of which may facilitate
children’s development in social understanding (Cutting & Dunn, 2006; Dunn, Brown,
Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991).
Parents

Research on the role of parental influence on children’s social understanding have
shown that individual differences in parenting practices, conversations, and relationship
quality each relate to children’s social understanding. Results are consistent with the evidence
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of difference between deaf and hearing children, cross-cultural differences, and the effect of
siblings. Each of these areas of research demonstrate that the content of children’s social
environment (e.g., cultural schemas, vocabulary) and the amount of exposure to the social
mind (e.g., number of siblings, age of learning a language) is related to individual differences
in children’s social understanding.
Children take an active role in their development, however, unlike adults, children
have much of their environments and their actions structured by other people (Baumrind,
1973). Specifically, parents have considerable control over the way children are socialized—
the events they participate in, the objects that they are surrounded by, and the conversations to
which they are privy. While acknowledging the importance of both biological and
environmental processes in development, it is apparent that maturational processes are
facilitated by the environment structured by a child’s parents. Parents introduce children to
the values, goals, and behaviors of the culture (Rogoff, 1990). Several questions are pertinent
to the current study. What do parents teach children about the mind? During social
interaction are parents implicitly or explicitly teaching children about others’ minds, peoples’
emotions, beliefs, intentions, and so on? What is the role of the parent-child attachment
relationship in formulating a social understanding? Research on the parents’ role in their
children’s social understanding has been extensive, and the evidence suggests that parents are
implicitly and explicitly teaching their children about other peoples’ minds. The review
covers several aspects of parenting including parenting style, parenting quality, and language.
Parenting style. Interested the influence of disciplinary style and children’s social
understanding, Ruffman, Perner, and Parkin (1999) asked mothers of 3- and 4-year-old

32

children to report their responses to various hypothetical disciplinary situations. Mothers who
reported that they would urge their children to consider the victim’s feelings after a
transgression had children that performed better on a false belief task.
In another study, Hughes, Deater-Deckard, and Cutting (1999) observed mothers with
their children during a 10-minute session of free play and a 10 minute structured situation
(i.e., working cooperatively with an Etch-A-Sketch to reproduce a model), as well as
interviewed mothers regarding their disciplinary behaviors. They then coded the observations
and interviews for parental warmth, behavioral control, and general discipline. Parental
behavior was a significant predictor of social understanding, but the pattern of results differed
between boys and girls. Among girls, maternal warmth was related to higher levels of social
understanding. Among boys, discipline was associated with increased social understanding. It
is noteworthy that there was no difference in the mean of boys and girls on either parental
warmth or discipline. Hughes et al. interpreted the results to suggest that boys and girls may
use their own understanding of the mind to elicit different behaviors in their parents. For
instances, girls may elicit more empathy and cooperation while boys may find new ways to
get in trouble. Or, parents may have different expectations for their male child compared to
their female child, and even interpret the same behavior differently resulting in different
communications between parent and child.
Pears and Moses (2003) assessed parental disciplinary styles in a parent’s report of
specific behaviors that had occurred and their response to those behaviors in a 24-hour period.
They also assessed demographic variables. Of the demographic variables (e.g., maternal
education, income, and number of siblings) maternal education was the strongest predictor of
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children’s understanding of beliefs and was moderately associated with perception, emotion,
and desire understanding. In contrast to Hughes et al., power assertive techniques were
negatively associated with belief understanding even when controlling for age. However,
power assertive techniques were positively associated with emotion understanding. To explain
this relationship, Pears and Moses proposed that power assertion is likely to involve strong
affect and that when parents use power assertive techniques children may learn that others
have different feelings regarding an event. Other interesting results were the findings that the
use of consequences, was negatively related to emotion understanding and that talking about
the victim’s feelings was moderately associated with emotion understanding, but not belief
understanding. These results suggest that specific aspects of parenting may be differently
related to specific aspects of children’s understanding. However, the results are correlational
and therefore cannot explain the exact relationship and direction of effect between variables.
In addition, this study did control for cognitive skills (i.e., IQ) of the child but neglected other
potentially important variables (e.g., temperament and prior Theory of Mind).
Although there is evidence for the influence of parenting style upon the development
of social understanding, these results may not generalize across cultures and across genders
since parenting practices are likely to vary (e.g., Hughes et al., 1999; Vinden, 2001). For
example, Vinden (2001) compared the parenting styles of Korean-American and AngloAmerican participants to their child’s theory of mind performance. Within the KoreanAmerican sample, authoritarian parenting was associated with advanced understanding of the
mind at age 5. In fact, Korean-American children performed better than their AngloAmerican counterparts. In contrast, among Anglo-American children there was a negative
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association between authoritarian parenting (i.e., conformity to parent’s perspective) and
children’s understanding of the mind. Clearly, the cultural context must be considered
important when explaining the relationship between parenting, and social influences more
generally, upon children’s social understanding.
Relationship quality. Attachment is an important and well researched construct in
developmental psychology. Attachment forms during infancy and early childhood, and
variations in attachment have been demonstrated to predict later social and cognitive
functioning. For example, infant attachment predicts later relationships with parents, siblings,
peers, and adults, developing self-concepts, autobiographical memory, social cognition, and
so on (see Thompson, 1999, for review). Most applicable to the current study, several studies
have found a relationship between attachment style and children’s understanding of the mind
(e.g., Fonagy, Redern, & Charman, 1997; Meins, 1997). Why might attachment be related to
children’s social functioning and the development of social understanding? Several
explanations are possible. Attachment may relate to children’s social cognitive development
which, in turn, leads to better social functioning; children’s social cognitive development may
promote both attachment and better social functioning; or, alternatively, parental behavior that
encourages attachment may also encourage children’s social cognitive development. This last
position suggests that perhaps parents who are more sensitive and responsive to their child
may be more concerned with promoting their children’s relationship with others and talking
about the mind. The evidence for this last perspective is considered at length because the
research suggests that individual characteristics of the mother may promote the development
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of children’s social understanding. This same process may lead to variations in children’s
social understanding during middle childhood.
As an example of evidence supporting this position, Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, and
Clark-Carter (1998) found that securely attached children demonstrated both advanced
symbolic and social understanding; and that mothers of securely attached children differed
from mothers of insecurely attached children in important ways. Four studies were conducted
among a longitudinal sample. In the first study, children were tested between 11 and 13
months in the strange situation paradigm and in symbolic play at 31 months. Controlling for
SES, securely attached children were more likely than insecurely attached children to take the
experimenter’s suggestions in symbolic play (e.g., using aluminum foil as a mirror for a doll).
This suggests that securely attached children may be better able to take another person’s
perspective. In study 2, mothers were observed as they assisted their child in building a box
that matched the model, in order to examine the level of instruction that mothers gave to their
child (i.e., below, above, or at the same skill level as the child). In the same session, mothers
were asked to describe their child and the descriptions were coded for mentions of mental,
behavioral, physical, and general descriptions of their child. Mothers of securely attached
children were more likely than insecurely attached children to provide age-appropriate
instruction to their child and to describe their child using mental descriptions. Meins et al.
argued that the mothers of securely attached children may be more likely to think of their
children as mental agents and therefore have more awareness of their child’s skills levels and
perspective. This was supported by the next study. Study 3 reported that at age 4 securely
attached children were more likely than insecurely attached children to pass an unexpected
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transfer task (i.e., a theory of mind task). Those children who passed the unexpected transfer
task were previously more likely to use experimenter’s suggestions in symbolic play at age 31
months and to have mothers that were sensitive tutors (i.e., provided sensitive instructions to
their child in the model building task) and to describe their child using mental descriptions at
age 3. Finally, study 4 was conducted at age 5. Children were tested on a picture identification
task and a false belief task that had an emotion understanding component. Securely attached
children performed better than insecurely attached children on the picture identification task.
The relationship between the picture identification task and attachment security suggests that
securely attached infants were better able to consider the information from the standpoint of
an uninformed observer.
Meins and colleagues (e.g., Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, and Clark-Carter, 1998) have
convincingly argued that the relationship between attachment and children’s social
understanding is mediated by the mother’s recognition of her child as a mental agent. At first
this would appear to be a departure from traditional attachment theory perspectives that
propose that attachment and social cognitive development results from parental sensitivity.
However, Meins and colleagues ague that a there may be a better way to operationalize
parental sensitivity in order to explain how parental sensitivity leads to either secure
attachment or social understanding. In their interpretation of parental sensitivity, they argue
that the parent’s ‘mind-mindedness’ would be a better predictor of children’s social
understanding than general sensitivity. Mind-mindedness refers to mothers who are sensitive
to their children’s mind and describe their children as mental agents. This maternal
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perspective would encourage both secure attachment as well as better social understanding.
Much research has supported this position.
Maternal mind-mindedness (defined as a mother’s age appropriate mental related
comments relating to a child’s current activity) is not just related to children’s theory of mind
but has been demonstrated to predict children’s theory of mind. Meins, Fernyhough,
Wainwright, Gupta, Fradley, and Tuckey (2002) observed maternal mind-mindedness early in
childhood to examine if mind-mindedness was related to childhood theory of mind and
whether maternal mind-mindedness was a stronger predictor of theory of mind skills than
general infant attachment. Maternal mind-mindedness was assessed at 6 months and
children’s theory of mind was assessed at 45 and 48 months. Of the variables assessed, only
children’s verbal scores and mother’s appropriate mind-related comments were related to
children’s later theory of mind performance. In contrast to Meins et al. (1998; see also
Symons & Clark, 2000; de Rosnay & Harris, 2002), early attachment, itself, was not an
independent predictor of later theory of mind performance. This result is intriguing because it
suggests a very early social predictor (6-months) of theory of mind. Furthermore, these
results demonstrate that it is not simply the affective relationship or general maternal
sensitivity that promotes children’s social understanding, but rather parent’s naïve theories or
orientation to the world may be mediating both.
Other research has found that attachment style is related to the content of the
conversations parents have with their children. For example, Fonagy and colleagues found
that mothers who were more likely to use mental terms (i.e., beliefs, desires, and intentions) in
a consistent and coherent way when talking about their relationships were more likely to have
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children who were securely attached (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Moran, & Higgit, 1991).
Additionally, Farrar, Fasig, and Welch-Ross (1997) demonstrated that attachment style was
related to the emotion talk in parent-child conversations. Positive emotion talk was more
common than negative emotion talk in all parent-child conversation, but insecure-attached
mother-daughter dyads had more negative emotion talk than secure-attached mother-daughter
dyads. Perhaps more importantly, when negative emotion talk was used, secure dyads were
more likely to elaborate on and discuss negative themes. Insecure-dyads were more likely to
ignore negative emotions. Secure mother-son dyads were more likely to talk about negative
emotions than insecure mother-son dyads and both mother-daughter dyads. Unfortunately,
Farrar et al. did not examine the relation between individual differences in conversations and
the child’s conception of emotions; however, differences in emotion talk in parent-child
discourse is likely related to the development of the child’s understanding of emotions (e.g.,
Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Telsa, & Youngblade, 1991).
To review, attachment style has been found to relate to children’s ability to take other
people’s perspectives and early competencies on theory of mind tasks. Mein’s position is that
maternal mind-mindedness mediates this relationship and that maternal mind-mindedness is a
better predictor of children’s later social understanding than attachment. Maternal mindmindedness leads to more sensitive and responsive parenting, as the parent is more likely to
interpret the child’s behaviors in mind sensitive ways and talk about the mind more with their
children. Furthermore, evidence has demonstrated that variations in maternal mental state talk
and talk about emotions is related to attachment style. If maternal mind-mindedness mediates
attachment and social understanding, a remaining question is how this process occurs?

39

Traditional explanations of attachment have argued that the relationship between early
attachment relationships and later social outcomes is mediated by internal working models
(Bowlby, 1982; Crittendon, 1990; Thompson, 1999). A person’s internal working model is
comprised of several representational systems including: (a) autobiographical memory (i.e.,
self), (b) an understanding of others’ minds (i.e., psychological causes of behavior), and (c)
memory for specific attachment related events and attributes of caregiver and others
(Thompson). While both maturational and social processes are involved in the development of
these working models, parental scaffolding may be particularly important (Fivush, 2011).
First, as Fivush has proposed, sensitive and responsive parenting may enable the child to
devote more processing resources to the outside world including other people rather than on
the parent or the child’s own needs (Fivush). A second possibility is that children are more
likely to internalize instruction and pay attention to parents who are affectively comforting to
the child. A third possibility is that sensitive parents model sensitive responding for the child.
The child then behaves sensitively towards peers and adults which results in more exposure to
other people’s minds. A fourth possibility is that attachment develops from the intersubjectivity between a child and his or her caregiver (Tomasello, 1999; Trevarthen, 1998).
That is, parents begin responding to their infant’s early behavior as if the behavior is
intentional (similar to a mother high in mind-mindedness). Around 7 to 9 months, infants
then begin to internalize this interpretation and see their own behavior (and later, other
people’s behavior) as intentional. A little later, children begin to perceive others as having
desires and beliefs like them. Thus, the basis for later social understanding is this early intersubjectivity.
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This last perspective is considered further as it is consistent with Meins’
conceptualization of maternal mind-mindedness and again explains how parental
characteristics lead to variations in social understanding. It is possible that an early grasp of
inter-subjectivity varies with parents’ theories regarding how intentional their infant’s
behaviors are. Parents are likely to interpret their infant’s behaviors as intentional, try to
create a shared perspective with the infant, and likely respond in age appropriate ways. For
example, some parents may be more or less willing to interpret an early grunt as conversation
than other parents. Differences in mind-mindedness may continue to accumulate with parents
continuing to be more responsive to their children, talking more about the child’s and other
peoples’ mind and more likely to interpret behaviors in terms of mental states. Importantly,
maternal mind-mindedness is not simply a construct appropriate to infancy. Differences in
maternal mind-mindedness may be a stable characteristic of mothers that may relate to
variation in parent-child interaction with older children. Mothers that are high in mindmindedness would continue to scaffold children’s experiences, demonstrate more elaboration,
make mind related inferences about the child’s behavior, encourage alternative perspective
taking, and talk more about the mind with their children. Of course, mothers high in mindmindedness will likely also have children that continue to exhibit more advanced social
understanding and, as such, likely elicit more opportunity for mothers to converse about the
mind.
Parental language. In the last section, I presented evidence that parent’s conception of
their infant as a mental agent is related to both the development of attachment and children’s
understanding of the mind. Parents with this orientation are more likely to view their children
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as being mental agents and more likely to talk about the mind in their conversations with their
children. In this section, I present evidence that exposure to mental state language is related to
children’s later social understanding (Brown, Donnelan-McCall, & Dunn, 1996; Brown &
Dunn, 1991; Dunn, 1994, 1995, 1996; Dunn & Hughes, 1998; Hughes & Cutting, 1999).
For example, Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Telsa, and Youngblade (1991) observed 50
children at age 33 months in their home and then returned at 40 months and assessed
children’s false belief performance and affective perspective taking. Both mother’s and
child’s talk were coded for instances of talk about affect and talk about causation (i.e.,
utterances that referred to the relationship between two events or mental states). A child’s
involvement in discourse about emotions and causality were both correlated with the child’s
performance on a false belief task and an affective perspective taking task 7 months later.
Furthermore, this relationship does not seem to be an outcome of particularly
precocious children. In an attempt to limit potential confounds between mental state talk, a
child’s precocity in social understanding, belief and emotion understanding, and general
language development, Ruffman, Slade, and Crowe (2002) measured mother’s conversation
(mental state utterances and non-mental state utterances), children’s own mental state
utterances, children’s theory of mind performance, and general language skills at 3 timepoints between the ages of 3 and 4. When children’s own mental state language and previous
theory of mind performance were statistically controlled, the mother’s mental state utterances
remained a unique predictor of the child’s subsequent theory of mind performance.
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However, there is some debate regarding what kinds of mental state talk is important.
Ruffman et al. argued that their data demonstrates that general talk about mental states
facilitates children’s social understanding more than specific talk about mental states.
However, Slaughter, Peterson, and Mackintosk (2007) reported that not all parental talk was
related to children’s understanding of beliefs. Rather, only parents’ use of cognitive
clarification (i.e., explanations that mentioned cognitive states while providing additional
explanations, causation, or contrasting perspectives) and references to the false belief at the
end of a provided story was related to children’s concurrent understanding of beliefs. General
use of cognitive, affective, and perception talk was not (see also, Peterson & Slaughter, 2003).
There are other ways that parents may influence children’s social understanding
during conversations. For example, mothers may promote their child’s social understanding
with probing questions. Research has demonstrated that children benefit from giving their
own explanations of other people’s behaviors (see Wellman & Lagattuta, 2004, for review).
This was documented in a microgenetic study that observed children’s acquisition of false
belief understanding (Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006). During the study, three groups of 3year-old children who had previously failed to understand false beliefs were compared. One
group was encouraged to explain the actions of the actor (e.g., “Why did Anne look in the
cupboard for the chocolate and not in the drawer?”). A second group was continuously tested
on false belief tasks during the 10 week session. A third group received no treatment. The
only group to improve during the study was the group that was required to give explanations
for the actor’s behavior. This type of questioning may be particularly important because it
directs the child to aspects of the event to pay attention to (e.g., mental causes). This in turn,
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allows the child the chance to internalize these explanations through the use of language and
provides an opportunity for the parent to correct misunderstandings. Importantly, children
benefitted from an adult engaging the child with questions.
Parents may also influence children’s social understanding by communicating about
constructs and values that are related to the development of self-concepts, concepts of gender,
social roles and so on that influence how children create self-identities (Cote & Bornstein,
2000; Fivush & Wang, 2005; Wang & Fivush, 2005). For example, people’s explanations of
the behaviors of themselves and others are often filtered through their gender concepts. With
young children, parents may rely on gender or physical explanations when they discuss other
people’s behaviors because they are external and easy to identify. With older children, parents
may be more willing to discuss internal causes or more complex explanations when they
discuss other people’s behaviors. Messages about gender are often communicated without
parents having explicit goals to teach children about gender. Parents may even have explicit
goals not to endorse specific stereotypes or explanations. However, parents often
communicate lessons implicitly. Gelman, Taylor, and Nyugen (2004) observed that mothers
are more likely to talk about gender in very subtle ways. For example, parents may ask
children to identify someone’s gender (e.g., “Is that a boy or a girl”) or use gender to refer to
other people (“There is a man washing his car”). These examples illustrate how parents may
implicitly teach children to pay attention to gender and that gender may be an important
difference in people’s actions.
Parents may also communicate messages about gender when they communicate to
boys and girls. Fivush and colleagues (e.g., Fivush, Berlin, Sales, Mennuti-Washburn, &
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Cassidy, 2003; Fivush, Brotman, Buckner, & Goodman, 2000) have demonstrated that both
mothers and fathers talk more and are more elaborative about negative emotions with their
daughters than their sons. This difference has been suggested to have an impact on how
children organize, interpret and evaluate events.
More broadly, in their language, parents teach children about what is important to pay
attention to, how to talk about things, how to respond to behaviors, how to interpret behaviors,
how to organize the world, how to evaluate information, and so on. Evidence for this comes
from a growing body of research that has demonstrated that individual differences in parental
language are related to their children’s memory for the past. This research has shown that
mothers who are more elaborative (i.e., introduce or expanded upon details of an event)
during mother-child conversations have children who remember more information (Fivush,
1991; Reese, Haden, and Fivush, 1993). How does this relate to children’s developing social
understanding? Indirectly, it suggests that mothers help children remember what is important
and what to pay attention to. Fivush, Haden, and Reese (2006) argue, “ by relating the past in
elaborated and detailed ways, mothers may be helping their children construct more detailed
representations of past events that may, in turn, help children link previous mental states to
current internal states and behaviors” (pg. 1576). At least one study has found that mothers
who link current mental events to their child’s past positively correlates with children’s theory
of mind performance (Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002).
Similarly, Fivush and colleagues (Fivush, Berlin, Sales, Mennuti-Washburn, &
Cassidy, 2003) have noted that mothers often talk to their children in distinct ways that are
related to the conversation topic. For example, when talking about events that evoked fear or
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sadness mothers were more likely to talk about emotional resolution (i.e., ways to resolve the
affect) than when the mother talked about anger. Mothers were also more elaborative and
evaluative in their conversations with their daughters than sons. Conversations with daughters
also were more likely to be about the interpersonal context (e.g., peers and family) than
conversations with sons. Fivush et al. suggested that conversational differences across context
and topic may be related to children’s emotional self-concept. Specifically, during
conversations children may be learning how they should express and share their emotions
with others, how to cope with emotions, and what kind of emotional person they are.
In addition, parents communicate information about their cultural values in their
conversations, and this information is related to the child’s concepts of self and others. In the
adult attribution literature, several cross-cultural differences are found between individuals
from individualistic cultures (e.g., United States) and individuals from collectivistic cultures
(e.g., China) (e.g., Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994; Schweder & Bourne, 1982).
Individuals from collectivistic cultures are more likely to make situational attributions and
their behaviors are often described in terms of their social relationships. In contrast,
individuals from individualistic cultures are more likely to make dispositional attributes and
emphasize uniqueness and autonomy. Cross-cultural differences in parental language style has
been demonstrated to match this pattern. Asian mothers are typically less elaborative in their
conversations about the past, focus on social interactions, and refer more to moral and
behavioral norms of behavior. In contrast, American mothers are more elaborative in their
conversations about the past, tend to co-construct narratives, spend a lot of time talking about
emotions, and focus on the child’s perspective and opinions (Choi, 1992; Miller, Fung &
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Mintz, 1996; Miller, Wiley, Fung & Liang, 1997; Mullen & Yi, 1995; Wang, 2001; Wang,
Leitchman, & Davies, 2000).
In summary, children learn a lot about their social world through their interactions
with others. Specifically, parents are in a unique position to teach their children about their
social world. They are typically their children’s first introduction to a community’s values,
expectations, behaviors, and mannerisms. They also offer their children an unconditional
context to discuss other people; and, they have a vested interest in teaching their children
about other people. Most of these lessons will be taught implicitly to the child through subtle
interactions and behaviors. For example, parents of very young infants begin teaching them
about the mind through their responses towards the child—inferring internal states and shared
experiences. Parents of older children may discuss topics that are ignored by parents of
younger children. However, whether these interactions are explicit or more tacit, children
begin to gain data to explain other people’s behaviors, they begin to learn what they should
pay attention to.
Child characteristics and advanced social understanding
The preceding research has demonstrated that children’s exposure to social
experiences appears to relate to their social cognitive development. This relationship has
largely been demonstrated by evidence that those children with more exposure to social
events or exposure to specific types of mental state talk master theory of mind tasks earlier
than their peers. The child’s role in influencing their exposure to these social events is
important to consider as children are not simply passive participant in these social events.
Some child characteristics may have important influence on the amount of social exposure
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children witness and the content of that social exposure. These in turn influence the content of
the child’s folk theory of mind.
For example, children with conduct disorder (Dodge, 1980) and children with social
anxiety (Banerjee & Henderson, 2001) both exhibit disruption in their social understanding.
In both situations, the disruption is thought to be related to the children’s social exposure.
Children who find social interaction highly pleasurable or who have had positive experiences
in their past are likely to seek out social experiences and learn more about other people’s
behaviors, values, attributes, skills, and expectations. Thus, these children accumulate more
cultural knowledge and are more competent in their social understanding. In contrast, children
who find these activities difficult or unrewarding have less opportunity to learn about other
people and have their current understanding questioned or challenged. In addition, a lack of
competence in social understanding is likely to result in failed social interactions that
reconfirm the child’s beliefs.
Additionally, the child’s gender and age are likely to be related to different social
experiences. Some researchers have found earlier competence in social understanding among
girls compared to boys (Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999), which may
be the result of different socialization practices. For example, beginning in preschool there are
differences in the ways parents talk to their daughters than their sons (e.g., Fivush, 1989;
1991). There may also be genetic sex differences that influence the child’s interest in and
attention to certain social events. Age is also an important determiner of the types of events,
conversations, interactions, situations, and so on that a culture deems appropriate for children
to participate in (Higgins & Parson, 1983). Variations in religion, ethnic, financial, and
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educational background are also likely to influence the social situations, concerns, and
conversations that children are exposed to.
In sum, numerous variables may be related to individual differences in the speed that
children acquire a more mature social understanding, the competence that they exhibit when
using their knowledge, and the overall organization or content of their social understanding.
The current study focuses on the child’s age, gender, current social understanding and the
content of the speech during mother-child conversations. Several of the studies reviewed
throughout this introduction have demonstrated a relationship between these variables and
young children’s social cognitive development. However, no known study has looked at how
social influences relate to older children’s understanding of the mind.
Therefore, some important questions remain. For example, what role do social
processes have on children’s social cognitive development during middle childhood? Are
social processes influenced by individual differences in the child (e.g., gender, age, prior
knowledge)? How might individual differences among parents be related to children’s social
experiences?
Brown and Dunn (1996) found that early family conversation about emotions and
causality were correlated with more advanced emotional understanding in middle childhood.
However, we do not know about the content of the conversation children are exposed to
during middle childhood and how that relates to children’s social understanding. It may be
that families who talk more about emotions and causality with their young children continue
to do so in the same way with their older children. Or, these same families may talk in more
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advanced ways to their older children. For example, these families may be more likely to call
attention to different perspectives, talk about recursive mental states (e.g., “ he thinks you
think…”), elaborate on complex emotions (e.g., jealousy), or involve children in more
conversations and roles that require a more advanced understanding of the mind (e.g.,
sarcasm, practical jokes) when their children are in middle childhood. It is also likely that
children who have more advanced social understanding elicit more advanced conversations
from their families during middle childhood.

CHAPTER 2
CURRENT STUDY

Since no previous studies have documented older children’s conversations about the
mind, the first objective was to examine the nature of children’s contributions to
conversations. A specific goal of this study was to explore how older children talk about the
mind. A second goal was to explore how mothers talk to older children about the mind. A
third goal was to explore how mother-child conversations relate to children’s age, gender, and
concurrent social understanding.
By studying children during middle childhood and exploring both age differences and
individual differences in mother-child conversations, this research builds on past research that
has demonstrated social influences on young children’s theory of mind. This research will
help elucidate some general questions about the relationship between children’s social
understanding and social processes. For example, how do these social processes, particularly
interactions with parents, enhance children’s understanding of their social world?
Specifically, are there features of the social environment that parents direct children’s
attention to? Do parents elaborate and interpret some features of the social experiences for
their child and not others? What role does the child have in constructing conversations around
social events? The current study tested the following hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 1

The first prediction was that older children would perform better than younger
children on two measures of advanced social understanding. Multiple studies using advanced
social cognitive tasks have demonstrated developmental differences between younger and
older children’s social understanding (e.g., Banerjee & Waitling, 2005; Baron-Cohen,
O'Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999; Perner & Wimmer, 1985). For example, older
children perform better than younger children in their ability to take multiple perspectives,
coordinate mental states (e.g., seeing a relationship between someone’s beliefs and their
emotions), and understanding recursion (e.g., “John thinks that Mary thinks…”). Differences
between younger and older children are also evident in children’s reasoning in different
domains of social understanding. For example, older children and younger children show
different reasoning in person perception, role taking, and empathetic sensitivity (Bosacki &
Astington, 1999). Because social cognition is a multifaceted construct two tasks were chosen
to measure children’s social cognition.
First, children’s understanding of second-order beliefs (i.e., recursion) was measured
using an adapted version for Perner’s and Wimmer’s ice-cream truck story (referred to as the
Second-Order False Belief task). Second-order belief understanding is considered to be an
important developmental milestone in children’s social understanding because it demonstrates
that children are capable of understanding that other people’s beliefs can be the target of
another person’s beliefs. This is an achievement above younger children’s understanding of
first-order beliefs.
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Second, children’s complex social understanding was measured by questioning
children about a social dilemma (referred to as the Social Dilemma task). While recursion is
an important developmental achievement, many theorists (for review, see Miller, 2012) have
proposed that complex social understanding includes several more aspects of social reasoning
beyond recursion. Children’s score on the Social Dilemma task was a composite score of
children’s reasoning about several aspects of social understanding. That is, the questions that
children answered include several sub-components of complex social understanding. These
included role taking, alternative role taking, empathetic reasoning, and person-perception
(Bosacki & Astington, 1999). Each of these components are aspects of social understanding
used by Bosacki (1998; Bosacki & Astington), which were originally identified by Chandler
(1987) and Wellman (1990). Each component was coded and scored according to increasing
cognitive complexity of the child’s response. “That is, the coding of the responses reflects the
child’s ability to understand the psychological world of the other, moving from simple,
obvious (‘surface’) characteristics to the interaction of several different abstract psychological
concepts and the integration of multiple and paradoxical perspectives” (Bosacki & Astington,
pg. 241). Higher scores indicated that the child was using psychological concepts that include
relating different mental states such as thoughts and emotions to one another, and referring to
recursive thought. Lower scores indicate that the child was focusing on behavioral features of
the situation.

53

Hypothesis 2

Second, it was predicted that consistent with Bosacki and Astington a gender
difference would favor girls on the Social Dilemma task and that there would be no gender
difference on the Second-Order False Belief task. Some research has suggested that girls
outperform boys on social understanding tasks (Banerjee, 1997;Bosacki, 2000; Bosacki &
Astington, 1999; Cutting & Dunn, 1999). However, this effect is not consistently found.
Gender differences were expected on the Social Dilemma task because past research has
found that girls demonstrate better performance than boys on social perspective taking (ZahnWaxler, Radke-Yarrow, & Brady-Smith, 1991), empathetic sensitivity measures, and express
more interest in interpersonal relationships between people (Honess, 1981; Peevers & Secord,
1973). Consistent with the literature on Second-Order False Belief, no gender differences
were expected on the Second-Order False Belief Task (Perner & Wimmer, 1985). One
explanation of why it was expected that gender differences would be present on one task (i.e.,
Social Dilemma task) and not the other task (i.e., Second-Order Task) was due to the content
of the two tasks (Miller, 2012). Both tasks involved some aspect of social understanding;
however, the Second-Order False Belief Task was only minimally social. In contrast, the
Social dilemma requires much more social perspective taking, empathetic sensitivity and
understanding of interpersonal relationships.
Hypothesis 3

Third, it was predicted that older children’s better social understanding would be
reflected in differences in talk between older children and younger children. That is, older
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children’s talk would differ from younger children’s talk in two ways. One, older children
would talk more about mental states, personal attributes, and emotions overall (referred to as
Basic Mental Talk). Two, older children would talk about others in more complex ways
(referred to as Advanced Mental Talk). For example, older children’s talk about the mind
would be characterized by the use of recursion (e.g., “He thinks that she thinks..”), talk about
the interaction between mental states (e.g., “Because John said the painting was ugly and John
didn’t know it was her painting when he said it, then he really thinks the painting is ugly and
not just teasing.”), and discussion of hidden and mixed emotions (collectively referred to as
Advanced Mental Talk). This relationship between the child’s age and the child’s talk about
the mind was expected to hold even when controlling for children’s receptive language.
Hypothesis 4

Fourth, it was predicted that an effect of gender would favor girls in both basic mental
talk and advanced mental talk. As previously explained, some research has suggested that
girls outperform boys on social understanding tasks (Banerjee, 1997;Bosacki, 2000; Bosacki
& Astington, 1999; Cutting &Dunn, 1999). Consistent with that literature, it was predicted
that girls would produce more basic mental talk and more advanced mental talk than boys.
Hypothesis 5

Fifth, it was predicted that mothers of older children would produce more basic mental
talk and more advanced mental talk than mothers of younger children. This hypothesis was
based on the prediction that mothers influence the development of their child’s social
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understand by talking about the mind and that mothers respond to their child’s conversational
interests and competence level (actual or perceived).
Hypothesis 6

Several studies suggest that boys and girls experience different socialization histories
(e.g., Fivush, Brotman, Buckner, & Goodman, 2000; Kuebli, Butler, & Fivush, 1995). For
example, mothers talk about emotions and use more supportive language when speaking with
their daughter than when speaking with their sons (Leaper, Anderson, & Sanders, 1998).
Similar to hypothesis 4, it was predicted that mothers would talk about the mind more with
girls than with boys. Thus, mothers would use more basic and more advanced mental talk
with girls.
Hypothesis 7

Seven, it was predicted that children’s social understanding would be related to
maternal talk about the mind. Among younger children, mother’s use of mind related
language is related to children’s social understanding. For example, mothers who frequently
refer to beliefs have children with better performance on false belief tasks. As such, it was
predicted that both maternal basic mental task and advanced mental talk would be related to
the development of children’s social understanding in this study.
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Hypothesis 8

Eight, it was predicted that children’s talk about the mind would be related to maternal
talk about the mind. How children talk about the mind should shadow how their mother talks
about the mind. It was predicted that maternal basic mental talk would be related to the
child’s basic mental talk and maternal advanced mental talk would be related to the child’s
advanced mental talk.

CHAPTER 3
METHOD

Participants

Participants were 38 mother–child pairs. Children were divided into a younger group of
11 males and 9 females (M = 5 years, 11.5 months; range: 5 years to 7 years) and an older
group of 10 males and 8 females (M = 9 years, 3 months; range: 7 years, 10 months to 10 years,
9 months)
Mothers were between the ages of 24 and 51 years old (M = 36.76). Most participants
were from two adult households (M = 1.89, SD = 0.51) and reported having between 1 and 4
children in the household (M = 2.18, SD = 0.80). Maternal education was as follows: 2.6% had
some high school education, 5.3% had a high school diploma or GED, 18.4% had between 1and 3- years of college, 21.1% had a Bachelor’s Degree, 36.8% had professional training, and
15.8% had a Ph.D. or professional degree. Maternal employment was as follows: 18.4% were
unemployed, 10.5% were students, 15.8% worked part-time, and 55.8% worked full-time.
Household income was as follows: 2.6% reported not knowing their income, 2.6% earned less
than $5,000, 2.6% earned between $5,000 and $11,999, 5.3% earned between $12,000 and
$15,999, 2.6% earned between $16,000 and $24,999, 7.9% earned between $25,000 and
$34,999, 2.6% earned between $35,000 and $49,999, 18.4% earned between $50,000 and
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$74,999, 34.2% earned between $75,000 and $99,000, and 21.1% earned more than $100,000.
Ethnic or racial data was not collected from participants. The ethnic and racial
makeup of the community in which the sample was was 78.9% White non Hispanic, 10.5%
Hispanic, 6.9% Black or African American, 2.6 % Asian, and 1.7% two or more races (U.S.
Census, 2012). All mothers and children spoke fluent English.
To recruit participants, fliers were sent home to children through the local elementary
schools and fliers were posted at public facilities within the community (e.g., libraries,
university bulletin boards, and grocery stores). Parents received $15 as compensation for
travel and time. Children were allowed to choose a small toy or game from a surprise box.
Examples of these items included stickers, yoyos, noise makers, and plastic animals.
Procedure

Participants were interviewed by a female experimenter. Participants were given the
option to participate in the lab or in their home. Six children were interviewed at home (3
older and 3 younger). These children were interviewed at a table in a separate room that was
removed from distractions (i.e., siblings, parents, television, pets, and so on). Parents were
brought to the table to complete the parent-child conversation portion. This procedure of
allowing participants to participate either at home or in the lab has been used in other research
involving parent-child conversation (e.g., Fivush, Berlin, Sales, Mennuti-Washburn, &
Cassidy, 2003).
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Parents and children were first introduced to the experimenters. During this initial
introduction participants were offered a snack and drink and time was spent talking to the
child to help build rapport with the participant. During this time the consent forms and child
assent was completed.
Following the introduction, the child and the experimenter moved into a second room.
In the lab, the second room is approximately 11’ x 11’. This room was furnished with a table,
two chairs, a small dresser, and a metal bookcase. Here the experimenter administered the
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test and the two measures of children’s social understanding
(see child measures below). Afterwards, the mother was brought into the room for the mother
and child to begin the four mother-child conversations (see parent-child measures below).
All responses were recorded either on tape or a digital audio recording device. The
three child tasks took approximately 20- 40 minutes to complete and the mother- child task
took approximately 7- 25 minutes to complete.
Training

Data collection was conducted by a trained undergraduate research assistant and the
author. Undergraduate research assistants were psychology and communication disorders
majors who have at least a 3.0 major GPA. Students had all completed course work in child
psychology. They all completed the CITI training. Research assistants received approximately
3 hours of training. Research assistances first participated in a mock trial of the study to
understand the procedure. Next, they received a training book that they reviewed at home and
were instructed to practice at home. The training book had all the stories and procedures for
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the experiment. Before working with children, the research assistant had to demonstrate
competence by successfully performing the procedure multiple times. During these trials,
various problems were created to see how the experimenter would respond. In addition, other
college age students volunteer as participants for training purposes. Each trial was observed to
ensure that appropriate methodology was being followed. Finally, the audio records of the
procedure were routinely checked to ensure that the procedure continued to be followed.
Each research assistant was trained on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test. The
author was first trained on the PPVT by an experienced researcher. To train the research
assistants, the procedure was first verbally described. Then the research assistant completed
the PPVT in the role of the participant. The assistant was then required to read the section of
the PPVT manual that explains the procedures. The research assistant then completed the
PPVT twice as the experimenter. Finally, the research assistant was asked to bring a peer into
the lab as a volunteer. Under supervision, the research assistant completed the PPVT as part
of the entire procedure. In total, the research assistant completed the PPVT at least three times
before they were allowed to work with the children.
Child Measures
Language

Children’s verbal ability was assessed using the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test
(PPVT-4) (Dunn & Dunn, 2007). The PPVT-4 is a commonly used measurement of
children’s receptive vocabulary. The PPVT or the British equivalent of the PPVT (i.e.,
British Picture Vocabulary Scale) has frequently been used in studies of children’s theory of
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mind development (e.g., Astington & Baird, 2005; Banerjee, Watling, & Caputi, 2011;
Peterson & Slaughter, 2003; see Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007 for a review). The PPVT4 was administered according to the PPVT-4 manual. The PPVT-4 manual states that the
PPVT can be administered by non-Level 2 users (i.e., an individual who has obtained a
bachelor’s degree) if trained by a Level 2 user. This was the criterion that was used in the
current study. A standardized score corresponding to the child’s age was used for analyses.
Social understanding
Two tasks were used to measure the child’s social understanding. One task assessed
the child’s second-order beliefs (i.e., Second-Order False Belief) and a second task assessed
the child’s advanced or complex social understanding (i.e., Social Dilemma).
Second-order false belief. Each child was read an adapted version of Perner and
Wimmer’s (1985) ice cream truck story (Parker, MacDonald, & Miller, 2007) (see Appendix).
A flip book accompanied the story. The book contained five illustrations to highlight events
in the story. These events were: John and Mary at the park; John and Mary speaking with the
ice cream man; John, alone at the park with the ice cream man; Mary, alone in her yard with
the ice cream man; and John, speaking with Mary’s mother.
After the story, the child was asked a Reality question (“Where has Mary gone to buy
her ice cream?) and a Memory question (Where was the ice cream man in the morning?”).
Each of the questions was open ended. If after 10 seconds the child did not respond the
experimenter assured the child that it is okay to respond “I don’t know” and read the forced
choice question. If the child failed either the Reality question (i.e., does not know the ice
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cream man is now at the church) or the Memory question (i.e., does not know the ice cream
man was at the park in the morning), the experimenter reread the story to the child. This
procedure is consistent with previous methodology and was intended to ensure that the child
comprehended the story before continuing with the test questions (e.g., Bosacki & Astington,
1999; Parker, MacDonald, & Miller, 2007). Two younger children were reread the story for
failing the Reality question. The child was then asked an open-ended Test question (“Where
does John think Mary has gone?”) and a Justification question (“Why does John think Mary is
there?”). Once again, a forced choice question was asked if the child did not respond within
10 seconds or chose home for the Test question.
The Reality question and the Memory question were not scored. Only the Test
question and the Justification question were scored. Following Parker, MacDonald, and
Miller, children received 1 point for correctly answering the Test question. The child received
1 point for an appropriate response to the Justification question if their justification occurred
in the story and led to John’s false belief. Justifications were judged to be inadequate if the
participant made up an event that did not happen in the story. Justifications were also coded as
being situational if the child mentioned a fact from the story (e.g., “Because the ice cream
man said he would sell Mary ice cream in the afternoon at the park) or as mentalistic if the
participant used a mental state term such as knew, wanted, think (e.g., “Because he doesn’t
know she’s going to the church”).
Responses to the Justification Question were coded by the author. A separate trained
experimenter coded 30% of all transcripts. The coders attained substantial agreement (Κ =
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.79) as defined by Landis and Koch (1977). Disagreements were resolved and the remaining
transcripts were coded by the author.
Social dilemma. A short social dilemma was used to assess the child’s advanced social
understanding. Each child was read one social dilemma that was adopted from Selman’s
research (e.g., Selman, 1980; Selman, Schorin, Stone & Phelps, 1983). In this dilemma the
protagonist had been invited to an event by a new child that conflicts with plans that the
protagonist previously made with an old friend (See Appendix). Before each story, the
participant was shown three black and white illustrations of the three characters. Each
illustration was approximately 6 inches x 3 inches and was labeled at the bottom with the
character’s name. The illustrations were shuffled and presented at random to the child. The
story characters were always the same sex and the characters’ sex was counterbalanced across
children. Following the dilemma, the child was asked to retell the story to assess the child’s
comprehension of the story. Children were required to identify the conflict between the two
invitations and that the old friend disliked the new friend. Children were reread the story if
there was any misunderstanding on these points. Four younger children and one older child
were reread the story.
The child was then asked (forced choice) which event the protagonist should attend
and why. In situations where the participant tried to compromise and chose both events, the
participant was instructed by the experimenter that the protagonist could only choose one
event to attend. The child was then asked to explain their decision and prompted to give any
additional reasons for the protagonist’s action (“Are there any other reasons why ______
should _______?”) (Role Taking). The child was then asked to explain why the protagonist
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might do the opposite action (“Can you think of any reasons why _________should
_________?”) (Alternative Perspective). These questions were adopted from Lane, Wellman,
Olson, LaBounty, and Kerr (2010). In the current study these questions were used to assess
children’s role-taking and alternative role taking abilities. Next, the child was asked about the
two other characters’ feelings (Empathetic Sensitivity) and to pick one of the characters and
describe that character (Person Perception). These questions were adopted from Bosacki and
Astington (1999). Each of the four questions addressed a sub-component of advanced
preadolescent children’s theory of mind: Role-taking, empathetic sensitivity, person
perception, and alternative role-taking (Bosacki & Astington; Chandler, 1987). Each subcomponent was coded according to increasing levels of cognitive complexity (e.g., recursion,
mental states related to each other). The composite score of these four questions should
therefore be a good estimate of children’s advanced social understanding. Typically children’s
social understanding is assessed with short answers or forced choice responses. However, the
goal of the open-ended response was to assess whether children would mention other
characters’ perspectives, feelings, beliefs, and so on without explicit questioning.
Children’s responses were transcribed verbatim from audio recordings. Children’s
responses were coded using Bosacki’s and Astington’s (1999; Bosacki, 1998) coding system.
For each of the four sub-component (e.g., Person Perception) the child received a score
ranging from 0-3. According to Bosacki and Astington, “[The coding scheme] represents
levels of interpersonal understanding based on increasing cognitive complexity of the
responses” (pg. 241).
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Perspective Taking, Alternative Explanation, and Empathic Sensitivity were scored
similarly. Children received 0 points for responses such as “I don’t know” or no response.
Children received 1 point for responses that mentioned a behavioral or situational description
(e.g., “Ice shows are fun”). Children received 2 points for responses that mentioned a mental
state or intention (e.g., “She wants to make a new friend”). Finally, children received 3 points
for responses that coordinated multiple perspectives, coordinate mental states, included moral
judgments, or included recursion (e.g., “She doesn’t want to hurt her best friend’s feelings”;
“She thinks that her best friend will think she doesn’t like her anymore.”).
The Person Perception question (describe a character) was also scored 0 - 3. Children
received 0 points for responses such as “I don’t know” or no response. Children received 1
point for responses that mentioned a behavioral or physical description (e.g., “He has blue
eyes” or “she was nice”). Children received 2 points for responses that mentioned a
psychological trait (e.g., “She is sensitive”), intentional traits (“she wants to be a good
friend”) and unelaborated contradictions (“she might be nice or she might not be”). Finally,
children received 3 points for responses that included self-reflective or recursive explanations
(e.g., “She thinks she is a nice girl”), complex psychological explanations or elaborations
(e.g., “ She wants to be a good friend but she also wants to be friendly to new people”), or
comparison (e.g., “He is more selfish than the average person”).
For each of the four subcomponents, if the child’s response met the criterion for two
or more categories, the child was given credit for the most advanced response (Bosacki,
1998). Additionally, the participant only received a score of 0-3 for each sub-component
measure. That is, where multiple questions were asked the participant only received one
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score. Again, the participants ‘best’ response was used. Scores were then combined to create a
score between 0-12. Thus, higher scores indicate more complex social understanding,
whereas lower scores indicate an emphasis on behavioral description.
All responses were coded by the author. A separate trained experimenter coded 30%
of all transcripts. The coders attained substantial agreement (Κ = .79) as defined by Landis
and Koch (1977). Disagreements were resolved and the remaining transcripts were coded by
the author.
Mother-Child Conversations

Conversations
Maternal-child conversations were elicited using 4 stories (see Appendix). Stories
were adapted from previous research (e.g., Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted,
1999; Selman, 1976).
Each story involved two to three characters and some kind of social dilemma or faux
pas. The story characters were always the same gender with the exception of the mother in the
male version of one of the stories. Each story had a male version and female version. The sex
of the characters were counterbalanced across participants. The participants each received two
female cast stories and two male cast stories. Each story was printed on an 8.5 x 11 inch piece
of paper. The top of the first page of each story was always an illustration of the characters in
the story with a neutral expression. These illustrations were approximately 2.5 inches x 2.5
inches head shots of the characters. The illustrations were black and white with the exception
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of a colored shirt to help identify the characters in the scene. The second page of each story
was an illustration of one scene from the story (e.g., mom speaking with the character;
children playing soccer). These illustrations were again black and white with the exception
of the character’s shirt. The characters in the scenes were always drawn from behind or from a
distance so that the facial expression of the child was not visible. The third page of each story
was the same illustrations seen on the first page.
Mothers were brought into the room with their child. The experimenter then
introduced the stories to the pair (See Appendix). The pair received each of the four stories
and was instructed to read the stories and discuss the stories similarly to how they might
discuss the events at home. The pair was informed that each story was followed by two
questions (i.e. “What do you think will happen next?”; “What would happen if this event
happened to you?”) that they should discuss, but that they should feel free to discuss
additional questions. Parents were instructed to move to the next story after they had
completed each story.
Descriptive data on mother-child conversations. To understand how much mothers and
children talked during these conversations, both the mother’s and the child’s utterances were
counted. Table 1 presents the mean number of words and the mean number of utterances for
each story for both the mother and the child. All words were counted with the exception of
vocalized fillers (e.g., uhh, umm) and repetitions (e.g., “I would, I, I would feel sad.”). While
these words did not count to the total number of words spoken, they were considered as part
of a conversational turn. Additionally, when the participant was reading the story this did not
count towards the total number of words or the total number of utterances.
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Table 1
Mean Number of Words and Turns Made by Mothers and Children, for each story.
Mothers
Words

Child
Turns

Words

Turns

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Younger

170.03

79.03

12.73

5.47

52.83

24.12

14.50

12.27

Males

177.46

76.00

13.27

5.25

53.5

21.51

16.77

15.64

Females

160.59

86.30

12.06

5.98

52.00

28.31

11.72

6.00

Older

187.47

125.88

13.32

8.25

95.12

62.69

12.03

7.12

Males

200.22

155.89

14.78

10.36

101.59

79.88

12.83

884

Females

171.53

171.53

11.50

4.50

87.03

34.72

11.03

4.55

Compared to younger children, older children used significantly more words in their
conversation F(1,34) = 6.71, p = 0.01. Mothers (M = 178.29) also spoken significantly more
words than children (M = 72.86), t(37) = 7.60, p < .001. Mother’s word count was
significantly correlated with children’s word count r(38) = .56, p < .001.
Coding and scoring mother-child conversations. Coding categories were derived from
previous scoring systems (e.g., Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002;
Wainryb, Brehl, & Matwin, 2005), but elaborated on to include concepts that are have been
theoretically relevant to older children’s theory of mind (e.g., Bosacki & Astington, 1999;
Miller, 2012; Selman, 1980). Categories are described in Table 2.
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Table 2
Coding Categories for Mother-Child Conversations
Categories
Emotions

Description and Examples
Reference to an emotion (e.g., “ He is sad” ;“ He was really sorry”)

Advanced Emotions

Reference to feeling two or more emotions together. (e.g., “She is
happy and sad.”;“ I was angry and upset” ), these should be a
combination of emotions and not emotion and action (e.g., “He is
sad and whiny”); internal emotions being different from the outer
emotion (e.g., “John looks like he is sorry but inside he is really
happy.”); Complex emotions (e.g., “He is jealous”)

Belief

Reference to what a person knows, thinks, or remembers (e.g., “ He
knows there is a frog in the box”) This should also include reference
to mental action of thinking (e.g., “This reminds me of the time…”;
“That Is exactly what I was thinking.”) and what someone doesn’t
know (e.g., “He didn’t know it was his painting.”). Does not include
“I don’t know” that may be substituted for ‘no response’ or
affirmations.

Desire

Reference to what a person wants or intends (e.g., “I wanted to play
with them.”; “That was not his intention.”)

Recursion or Mental
States Related to Each
Other

Reference to two or more mental states, perspectives, or instances of
recursion that are causally linked. (e.g, “Rachel was upset because
she thinks John thinks she looks like a boy.”; “You were sad
because you didn’t know she was only joking”; “I lied because I
didn’t want to hurt her feelings.”; "They didn’t care how he felt.”).
This category should occur in a conversational turn.

Contrasting
Perspectives

Reference to one person feeling different or thinking something
different from another person (e.g., “Everyone was happy, except
the old frog.”; “Everyone else thought it was an accident, but I
didn’t think it was.”;“But isn’t artwork something that is individual?
That means what we like to draw; maybe Chase likes to draw
something different.” “She wanted to play with me, but I wanted to
make new friends.”).

(continued on following page)
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Table (continued)
Personality Traits

Reference to a person’s personality or disposition. (e.g., “She is
nice”)

Mental Questions
(Mothers only)

Questions that seek additional information about the inner state of a
person, but that are not repetitions or affirmations (e.g., “He is sad,
huh?”). These should refer explicitly to what someone thinks,
believes, remembers, understands or desire/intends (e.g.,“ Why do
you think he said that”; “What do you think that person is
thinking?”, “do you understand what happened in the story?”). Do
not include behavioral directions (e.g., “Do you wanna turn the
page?”). The mental content should be the subject of the sentence.
Since participants were asked “What do you think will happen
next?” do not include these types of questions that begin this way
unless there is a second reference to thought (e.g.,” Do you think he
knew it was Nick’s painting?”)

Emotion Questions
(Mothers only)

Questions that seek additional information about the inner state of a
person but that are not repetitions or affirmations (e.g., “He is sad,
huh?”). These should refer explicitly to what someone feels (e.g.,
“How do you think that person feels?”)
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Mothers-child conversations were transcribed verbatim by a research assistant and
then verified. The mother’s and the child’s dialogue were analyzed separately. For each story,
participants received a score of absent “0” or present “1” for each category (see Table 2). The
units of measurement were instances of a category. That is, a sentence could be coded as
containing multiple categories. This is consistent with methodology used by Wainryb, Brehl,
and Matwin (2005) to code children’s narratives of interpersonal conflict. Since one motherchild pair completed only three stories, a proportion score was used that referred to the
percentage of stories that included each response category. For example, if a child mentioned
basic emotions (i.e., “he is sad”) once across all four stories, he would receive a score that
indicated that he used emotion in 25% of his conversations (i.e., .25). In contrast, a child who
mentioned a basic emotion in all four of the stories would receive a score indicating that he
used emotion in 100% of the stories (i.e., 1). One pair (i.e., younger male) was removed from
the data because of technical issues that resulted in a loss of the majority of their conversation.
The scoring and composition of all constructs are shown in Table 3. Two mental talk
scores were created by combining the proportion scores for each of the categories. For
example, the Basic Mental Talk score consisted of basic emotion, desire, belief, and
personality traits. If a child mentioned emotion in four stories (i.e., 1.00), desire in one story
(i.e., 0.25), belief in two stories (i.e., 0.50), and made no mention of personality traits (i.e., 0),
he or she would receive a score of 1.75 for Basic Mental Talk. A child would receive a score
of 4 for Basic Mental Talk if he or she mentioned emotion, desire, belief, and personality in
each story. Advanced Mental Talk score consisted of advanced emotion, contrasting
perspectives, and recursion or related mental states. If a child mentioned advanced emotion in
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four stories (i.e., 1), contrasting perspectives in one story (i.e., .25), and recursion in one story
(i.e., .25) he or she would receive a score of 1.5 for Advanced Talk. A child would receive a
score of 3 for Advanced Mental Talk if he or she mentioned advanced emotion, contrasting
perspectives, and recursion or related mental states in all four stories.
Table 3
Summary of Constructs
Social Understanding
Second-Order False
Belief

Range
0–3

Composite
Test Question (0-1); Appropriate justification
(0-1); Mentalistic Justification (0-1)

0 - 12

Role Taking Question (0-3); Alternative
Thinking Question (0-3); Empathy Question
(0-3); Alternative Thinking (0-3)

0-4

Emotions (0-1); Desire (0-1); Belief (0-1);
Personality trait(0-1)

0-3

Advanced Emotions (0-1); Contrasting
Perspectives (0-1); Recursion or Mental states
related to each other (0-1)

0–4

Emotions (0-1); Desire (0-1); Belief (0-1);
Personality Trait (0-1)

Advanced Mental Talk

0–3

Advanced Emotions (0-1); Contrasting
Perspectives (0-1); Recursion or Mental states
related to each other (0-1)

Mental questions

0–1

Mental Questions (0-1)

Emotion Questions

0–1

Emotion Questions (0-1)

Social Dilemma

Child Mental Talk
Basic Mental Talk

Advanced Mental Talk

Maternal Mental Talk
Basic Mental Talk

Prior to combining scores, inter-rater reliability was achieved by having the author and
a second experimenter score 30% of all the stories. Kappas ranged from .73 to 1.00. This
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range is consistent with this literature (e.g., Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002; Wellman, Fang,
Liu, Zhu, & Liu, 2006) (see Table 4 for percentages and Kappa values. All disagreements
were resolved through discussion and then the remaining transcripts were coded by the
author.
Table 4
Percentage (Kappa) of Agreement between Experimenters for Mother-Child Conversations
Mother

Child

Emotions

98% (.96)

92% (.88)

Beliefs

89% (.78)

96% (.90)

Desire

94% (.88)

96% (.90)

Personality Traits

96% (.79)

98% (.88)

Advanced Emotions

96% (.79)

96% (.82)

Recursion and Mental States
Related to Each Other

92% (.82)

96% (.75)

Contrasting Perspectives

96% (.73)

100% (1.00)

Mental Questions

94% (.85)

_

Emotions Questions

92% (84%)

_

Conversational Element

CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Age and Gender Differences in Social Understanding: Hypotheses 1 and 2

Hypothesis 1 predicted that older children would perform better than younger children
on the two measures of social understanding, the Second-Order False Belief task and the
Social Dilemma task. Hypothesis 2 predicted that there would be a gender difference
favoring girls for the Social Dilemma task, but that there would not be a gender difference for
the Second Order False Belief task. To examine age and gender differences in children’s
social understanding the Second-Order False Belief task and the Social Dilemma task were
analyzed separately. The results of those analyses are described below.
Second-Order False Belief Task

Performance on the Second-Order False Belief task was analyzed by examining scores
for correct responses to the test question (i.e., where John will look for Mary), adequate
justifications for the justification question (i.e., Why does John think Mary is there), and
spontaneous mention of a mental state in the justification. One participant was removed from
these analyses because he did not choose between the park and the church in the test question.
Of the remaining 37 participants, 83.8 % of the children gave a correct response to the test
question; 70.3% of the children were judged to have given an adequate justification of John’s
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belief; and only 18.4% of children spontaneously mentioned a mental state in their
justification. A series of Chi-Squares were used to compare performance by Age and Gender
on each of the three variables.
More older children than younger children produced adequate justifications, Χ2 =
4.86, p = 0.03. The proportion of participants in each age group correctly answering the test
question and the proportion of participants in each age group giving adequate justifications
are reported in Table 5. There was no significant difference between the number of younger
children and the number of older children who gave correct responses to the Test question, Χ2
= 0.46, p = 0.50. Additionally, there was not a significant difference between the two age
groups in the proportion of children providing a mental justification, Χ2 = 3.48, p = 0.06. See
Table 4. There were no gender difference for the test question, Χ2 = 0.13, p = 0.72, the
justification question, Χ2 = 0.85, p = 0.37, or the mental justification, Χ2 = 0.68, p = 0.41 (see
Table 6). Performance on the Second Order False Belief task was consistent with both
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.
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Table 5
Proportion of Participants in each Response Category for each of the Second-Order False
Belief Task Variables by Age
Test question
Age

Adequate justification

Mental justification

Incorrect

Correct

No

Yes

No

Yes

Younger

0.20

0.80

0.45

0.55

0.70

0.30

Older

0.12

0.88

0.12

0.88

0.94

0.06

Total

0.16

0.84

0.30

0.70

0.81

0.19

Table 6
Proportion of Participants in each Response Category for each of the Second-Order Belief
Task Variables by Gender
Test question
Age

Adequate justification

Mental justification

Incorrect

Correct

No

Yes

No

Yes

Males

0.14

0.86

0.24

0.76

0.86

0.14

Females

0.19

0.81

0.38

0.62

0.75

0.25

Total

0.16

0.84

0.30

0.70

0.81

0.19
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Social Dilemma

For the Social Dilemma task, a 2 x 2 (Age x Gender) ANCOVA was conducted for
each of the four questions that were asked during the Social Dilemma task: Perspective
Taking, Alternative Perspective Taking, Empathetic Sensitivity, and Person Perception.
Participants’ standardized PPVT score was entered as a covariate for each of the ANCOVAs.
All participants were included in these analyses. There was a main effect of Age for
Perspective Taking, F(1,33) = 6.20, p = 0.02, ηp 2 = 0.16, Empathetic Sensitivity, F(1,33) =
9.46, p = 0.004, ηp2 = 0.22, and Person Perception F(1,33) = 4.16, p = 0.05, ηp 2 = 0.11. Older
children performed better than younger children on each of these questions. The means and
standard deviations are reported in Table 7. There were no significant effects for Gender for
any of the four questions (See Table 8).
A combined score was created using children’s scores on each of the social dilemma
questions. A 2 x 2 ANCOVA was also conducted on this score controlling for children’s
receptive language (i.e., PPVT). There was a main effect of Age F(1,33) = 10.14, p = 0.003,
ηp2 = 0.24. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, older children performed significantly better than
younger children. However, contrary to Hypothesis 2, there was no effect of gender.
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Table 7
Mean, Standard Deviations, and Age Effects for Social Dilemma Subscales
Perspective Taking

Younger
1.20 (0.62)

Older
1.83 (0.92)

F
6.20*

Alternative Perspective Taking

1.50 (0.95)

1.44 (0.78)

0.07

Empathetic Sensitivity

1.80 (0.70)

2.44 (0.86)

9.46*

Person Perception

1.45 (0.60)

1.89 (0.96)

4.16*

Combined Score

5.95 (1.64)

7.61 (2.40)

10.14*

* p< .05

Table 8
Mean, Standard Deviations, and Gender Effects for Social Dilemma Subscales
Perspective Taking

Males
1.48 (0.87)

Females
1.53 (0.80)

F
0.15

Alternative Perspective Taking

1.43 (0.87)

1.53 (0.87)

0.78

Empathetic Sensitivity

2.14 (0.91)

2.06 (0.75)

0.13

Person Perception

1.52 (0.68)

1.82 (0.95)

2.50

Combined Score

6.94 (2.36)

6.74 (2.18)

1.82

* p< .05
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In summary, an Age effect was found on both the Second-Order False Belief task and
the Social Dilemma task. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, older children performed better than
younger children on both tasks. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, there were no gender differences on
either task.
Age and Gender Differences in Children’s Talk: Hypotheses 3 and 4
Hypothesis 3 predicted that older children’s conversations would differ from younger
children’s conversation in two ways: (a) older children would talk more about beliefs, desires,
personal attributes, and basic emotions than younger children (i.e., Basic Mental Talk), and
(b) older children’s conversation would include reference to more advanced emotions,
contrasting perspectives, and recursion or mental states related to each other than younger
children’s conversations (i.e., Advanced Mental Talk). Hypothesis 2 predicted girls’
conversations would have more instances of both Basic Mental Talk and Advanced Mental
talk than boys’ conversations. To examine these two hypotheses Basic Mental Talk and
Advanced Mental Talk were analyzed separately. The results of those analyses are described
below.
Basic Mental Talk
A 2 x 2 ANCOVA (Age x Gender) controlling for children’s receptive language was
conducted on Basic Mental Talk scores. There was a main effect of Age F(1,32) = 7.39, p =
0.01, ηp2 = 0.19. Older children (M = 1.47, SD = 0.52) provided more instances of Basic
Mental Talk than young children (M = 1.05, SD = 0.43). There was no significant effect of
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gender (Boys: M = 1.23, SD = 0.54; Girls M = 1.29, SD = 0.50), F(1,32) = 0.27, p = 0.61 or
significant interaction F(1,32) = 2.34, p = 0.14.
Advanced Mental Talk
A 2 x 2 ANCOVA (Age x Gender) controlling for children’s receptive language was
conducted on Advanced Mental Talk scores. There was a main effect of Age F(1,32) = 7.54,
p = 0.01, ηp2 = 0.19. Older children (M = 0.47, SD = 0.49) had more instances of Advanced
Mental Talk than younger children (M = 0.14, SD = 0.19). There was no significant effect of
gender (Boys: M = 0.33, SD = 0.48; Girls M = 0.28, SD = 0.29), F(1,32) = 0.00, p = 0.99 or
significant interaction, F(1,32) = 0.01, p = 0.91.
In summary, Hypothesis 3 was supported by the data. Older children’s conversations
included more instances of both Basic Mental Talk and Advanced Mental Talk than young
children’s conversations. Contrary to expectations, Hypothesis 4 was not supported by the
data. There were no gender differences in either kind of talk.
Children’s Talk and Children’s Social Understanding
No specific predictions were made about the relationship between children’s talk and
their concurrent social understanding. After controlling for children’s age in years and
children’s language, children’s Advanced Mental Talk was correlated with children’s basic
mental talk, and children’s advanced mental talk was correlated with children’s performance
on the social dilemma task (see Table 9).
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Table 9
Correlations between Children’s Talk and Children’s Social Understanding
1

2

3

4

1.00

.51*

.23

.20

1.00

.20

.46*

1.00

.18

Child’s Mental Talk
1. Basic
2. Advanced
Social Understanding
3. Second-Order Task
4. Social Dilemma

1.00

* p < .01
Age and Gender Differences in Mother’s Talk: Hypotheses 5 and 6
Hypothesis 5 predicted that mothers of older children would have more instances of
Basic Mental Talk and Advanced Mental Talk than mothers of younger children. Hypothesis
6 predicted that mothers of girls would have more Basic Mental Talk and Advanced Mental
Talk than mothers of boys. Again, Basic Mental Talk and Advanced Mental Talk were
analyzed separately. The results of those analyses are reported below.
Basic Mental Talk

A 2 x 2 ANCOVA (Age x Gender) controlling for children’s receptive language was
conducted for maternal Basic Mental Talk. There were no significant age F(1,32) = 2.41, p =
0.13 (Younger M = 1.12, SD = 0.76; Older: M = 1.36, SD = 0.65) or gender F(1,32) = 0.39, p
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= 0.54 (Boys M = 1.24, SD = 0.71; Girls: M = 1.24, SD = 0.73) differences for maternal Basic
Mental Talk.
Advanced Mental Talk

A final 2 x 2 ANCOVA (Age x Gender) controlling for children’s receptive language
was conducted for maternal Advanced Mental Talk. There was a main effect of Age F(1,32)
= 9.77, p = 0.004, ηp2 = 0.23. Mothers of the older children (M = 0.68, SD = 0.44) produced
more instances of Advanced Mental Talk than mothers of the younger children (M = 0.36, SD
= 0.32). There was no significant effect of gender F(1,32) = 0.14, p = 0.71 (Boys M = 0.53,
SD = 0.44; Girls: M = 0.49, SD = 0.38) or significant interaction F(1,32) = 0.04, p = 0.85.
In summary, Hypothesis 5 was partially supported. Mothers of older children
produced more instances of Advanced Mental Talk than mothers of younger children.
However, mothers of older children did not produce more instances of Basic Mental Talk than
mothers of younger children. Additionally, the data did not support Hypothesis 6. There was
no statistical difference between mothers of girls and mothers of boys in regards to either kind
of talk.
Hypothesis 7

Hypothesis 7 predicted that maternal talk would be related to children’s social
understanding. To examine the relationship between maternal talk and children’s social
understanding, bivariate correlations between maternal Basic Mental Talk, maternal
Advanced Mental Talk, maternal Mental Questions, maternal Emotion Questions, and
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children’s combined score on the social dilemma task and children’s combined score on the
Second Order Belief Task. These results are presented below.
There were statistically significant correlations between maternal Advanced Mental
Talk and children’s scores on the social dilemma task and between maternal Basic Mental
Talk and children’s scores on the Second Order Belief Task (see Table 10). Neither maternal
Mental Questions nor maternal Emotion Questions were related to children’s social
understanding.

84

Table 10
Correlations between Child Variables, Maternal Talk, and Child’s Social Understanding
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

-.19

.30

.45**

-.34*

-.17

.31

.18

1

.28

.26

.43**

.12

.26

-.03

1.00

.33*

.23

.05

.31

.49**

1.00

.20

.08

.47**

-.03

1.00

.24

.04

.04

1.00

- .22

-.01

1.00

.24

Child Variables
1. Age
2. Language Score
Maternal Mental Talk
3. Basic Talk
4. Advanced Talk
5. Mental Questions
6. Emotion Question
Social Understanding
7. Social Dilemma
8. Second Order
Belief Task
* p < .05
** p < .01

1.00
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Next, a hierarchical linear regression was conducted to determine whether maternal
talk was related to children’s social understanding independent of children’s age and language
ability. In the first step of the regression, age and children’s PPVT scores were entered first.
These two variables predicted 20% of the variability in children’s Social Dilemma scores,
F(2,36) = 4.19, p = 0.02. Next, maternal Basic Mental Talk, maternal Advanced Mental Talk,
maternal Emotion Questions, and maternal Mental Questions were entered into the second
step of the regression. These maternal language measures increased the variance explained to
39%, F(6,36) = 3.19, p = 0.02 (see Table 11). Thus, maternal mental talk increased the
variance in children’s Social Dilemma scores above age and language.
Table 11
Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Predictor Variables of Children’s Social Dilemma
Scores.

1

2

R2

B

SE

β

PPVT

.05

.02

.34

.20 0.04

Age

.41

.18

.36

0.03

PPVT

.04

.03

.28

.39 0.12

Age

.10

.23

.09

0.67

0.98 .42

0.03

Model

Variable

Advanced Mental Talk 2.23

p

Basic Mental Talk

-0.21 .54

-0.7

0.68

Emotion Questions

-2.44 1.06 -.34

0.03

Mental Questions

-0.36 1.26 -.05

0.76

86

Similarly a hierarchical regression was conducted to determine whether maternal
language was a unique predictor of children’s performance on the Second-Order False Belief
task. This analysis revealed that age and PPVT were not a significant predictor of children’s
combined Second-Order Belief scores, R2 = .03, F(2,35) = 0.44, p = 0.65. Step 2 of the model
was not significant either, R2 = .22, F(6,35) = 1.36, p = 0.26.
In summary there was some support for Hypothesis 7. Maternal Advanced Mental
Talk was related to children’s Social Dilemma Scores and that maternal language was a
unique predictor of children’s Social Dilemma Scores above age and language scores.
Maternal Basic Mental Talk was related to children’s Second-Order False Belief scores.
Hypothesis 8
Hypothesis 8 predicted that maternal mental talk would be related to children’s mental
talk. To examine the relationship between maternal talk and children’s talk, maternal Basic
Mental Talk, maternal Advanced Mental Talk, maternal Emotion Questions, and maternal
Mental Questions were examined in relation to child’s Basic Mental Talk and child’s Mental
Talk. Both maternal Basic Mental Talk and Advanced Mental Talk were correlated
significantly with children’s Advanced Mental Talk (see Table 12). Neither maternal Basic
Mental Talk nor Advanced Mental Talk were correlated with children’s Basic Mental Talk
and Advanced Maternal Emotion Questions and Mental Questions were not correlated
significantly with children’s talk.
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Table 12
Correlations between Maternal Mental Talk, Child Mental Talk, and Child Variables
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1.00

-.19

.30

.45**

-.34*

-.17

.39*

.52**

1.00

.28

.26

.43**

.12

-.09

.07

1.00

.33*

.23

.05

.30

.45**

1.00

.20

.08

.27

.45**

1.00

.24

.01

-.23

1.00

-.04

-.17

1.00

.61**

Child Variables
1. Age
2. PPVT
Maternal Mental Talk
3. Basic Talk
4. Advanced Talk
5. Mental
Questions
6. Emotion
Questions
Child Mental Talk
7. Basic Talk
8. Advanced Talk
* p< 0.05
** p < 0.01

1.00
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Next, two separate hierarchical regression were conducted to determine whether
mother’s mental talk was a unique predictor of children’s mental talk independent of
children’s age and children’s language. Children’s Basic Mental Talk was used as the
dependent variable in the first analysis. Age and PPVT scores were entered in step 1. These
variables were not significant predictors, R2 = .12, F(2,36) = 2.39, p = 0.11. Maternal Basic
Mental Talk, Advanced Mental Talk, Emotion Questions, and Mental Questions were entered
in step 2. Again, this model was not significant, R2 = .20, F(6,36) = 1.21, p = 0.33.
Next, children’s Advanced Mental Talk was used as the dependent variable. Again,
children’s age and PPVT scores were entered in step 1. Twenty-nine percent of the variance
in children’s Advanced Mental Talk was accounted for by this model, F(2,36) = 7.04, p =
0.003. Maternal Basic Mental Talk, Advanced Mental Talk, Emotion Questions, and Mental
Questions were entered in step 2. Maternal language increased the variance explained to 46%,
F(6,36) = 4.17, p = 0.004.
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Table 13
Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Predictor Variables of Child’s Advanced Mental Talk
Model
1

2

Variable

B

SE

β

R2

p

PPVT

.05

.004 .17

Age

.12

.03

PPVT

.001 .005 .05

Age

.04

.04

.18

.34

Basic Mental Talk

.17

.09

.29

.08

Advanced Mental Talk .32

.17

.33

.07

Emotion Questions

-.22

.19

-.17

.24

Mental Questions

-.47

.22

-.28

.11

.55

.29 .26
.001
.46 .75

Summary
While the majority of children were successful on the second-order false belief task,
significantly more older children than younger children were able to give adequate
justification for their responses. Older children also gave more mentalistically complex
responses to the social dilemma task as indicated by higher scores on 3 of the 4
subcomponents measures and a higher composite score of the social dilemma task.
Additionally, older children had more instances of basic mental talk and advanced mental talk
during the mother-child conversations. No gender effects were found.
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Mothers of older children produced more instances of advanced mental talk than
mothers of younger children. Maternal basic mental talk was related to children’s
performance on the second-order belief task and maternal advanced mental talk was related to
children’s performance on the social dilemma task. Overall maternal language scores were a
unique predictor of children’s performance on the social dilemma task and children’s
advanced mental talk.

CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
The main goal of this study was to investigate the relationship between mother-child
conversation and children’s social understanding during middle childhood. That is, this study
examined how individual differences in mother-child conversations about social events are
related to children’s age, gender, and social understanding. Eight hypotheses were
investigated. The first hypothesis was that older children would demonstrate more advanced
social understanding than younger children. The second hypothesis was that girls would
demonstrate more advanced social understand than boys. The third hypothesis was that older
children would produce more advanced talk about the mind than younger children. The fourth
hypothesis was that girls would produce more advanced talk about the mind than boys. The
fifth hypothesis was that mothers of older children would produce more advanced talk about
the mind than mothers of younger children. The sixth hypothesis was that mothers of girls
would produce more advanced talk about the mind than mothers of boys. The seventh
hypothesis was that children’s social understanding would be related to maternal talk about
the mind. The eighth hypothesis was that children’s talk about the mind would be related to
maternal talk about the mind. The results relevant to each of these hypotheses will be
discussed below.
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Social Understanding
Age Differences
The first hypothesis was that older children would perform better on measures of
advanced social understanding. Two tasks were used to measure children’s social
understanding—the Second-Order False Belief task and the Social Dilemma task. The
Second-Order False Belief Task was an adapted version of Perner’s and Wimmer’s Ice Cream
Truck Story that measured children’s understanding of second order beliefs (e.g., “John thinks
Mary thinks…”). In this study, the majority of the participants demonstrated an understanding
of second-order beliefs by correctly answering the test question (i.e., “Where will John look
for Mary?”). While there was no age differences on the test question, older children were
more likely provide an adequate explanation for their response. That is, they more often
referred to mental content or relevant information (e.g., “John doesn’t know she talked to the
ice cream man”) than to irrelevant or incorrect information (e.g., “Because he was hiding
behind a bush and heard them talking.”) There was no age difference in the spontaneous
mention of mental states in children’s justification (e.g., “Because John doesn’t know Mary
talked to the ice cream man.”). In fact, only a small minority of children directly mentioned a
mental state in their justification.
Perner and Wimmer (1985) found that it was not until 7 or 8 that the majority of
children succeed on the second-order false belief task. However, the youngest children in this
study were between 5- and 7-years old and the majority of them demonstrated success on the
test question and the justification question; at least half gave appropriate justification for their
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answer. These results are more consistent with subsequent studies that have demonstrated
competence among children who are younger than Perner and Wimmer originally reported
(Miller, 2012). Additionally, even though a majority of the children were successful some
children may struggle with this type of reasoning into middle or later childhood. Another
inconsistency between the current study and Perner’s and Wimmer’s original results was the
lack of spontaneous mention of mental states. In the current study this was relatively rare and
though there was no statistical difference between younger and older participants,
spontaneous mention of mental states was more common among younger children than older
children. Speculatively, it may be that the explicit mention of mental states is relatively rare
because they are implied between conversational partners and thus, people take
conversational shortcuts. This result is consistent with Miller (2013) who reported that in his
sample of 6- to 8-year olds, between 35% and 39% of participants spontaneously mentioned
mental states and only with additional questioning did the proportion increase to between 50%
and 53% of participants.
The Social Dilemma task was the second measure of social understanding used in the
current study. This task was modeled after Bosacki and Astington (1999). The task was in line
with other advanced social understanding tasks that measure children’s mentalistic reasoning
with the use of stories that are embedded into a social context and are arguably more complex
and realistic. This measure addressed several components of social understanding beyond
second-order beliefs. Specifically, those skills included perspective taking, alternative
perspective taking, empathetic sensitivity, and person perception. Following Bosacki and
Astington, children’s responses were scored in regards to the complexity of the participant’s
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response. That is, lower scores indicate the use of situational or behavioral explanations and
higher scores indicate the use of abstract and complex mental explanations. This task was not
significantly correlated with the second-order belief task in this study. Past studies have
sometimes found a relationship between second-order belief tasks and advanced social
understand tasks (e.g., Banerjee, 2000; Meristo & Hjelmquist, 2009), but sometimes they
have not (e.g., Hayward & Homer, 2011) (see Miller 2012 for review). Miller suggests that
because second-order belief tasks are relatively easy for older children, there may not be
sufficient variability in performance to detect a correlation between the two tasks.
In the present study, an age effect was found for three of the four component skills of
advance social understanding. Specifically, the average score of older children compared with
younger children was higher for perspective taking, empathetic sensitivity, and person
perception. Older children did not have higher scores for the alternative perspective taking.
For the alternative perspective taking measure, children were asked to give an explanation for
why the story character might do the opposite activity (e.g., “Can you think of any reasons
why Adam should go to the circus with Eric instead of play games with Josh?”). As such, this
question is somewhat dependent on the child’s response to the first perspective taking
question (e.g., “Why do you think Adam should play games with Josh?”). As part of the first
question children were to select one activity for the main character to participate in and give
an explanation for that decision. It may be that older children chose activities based on more
complex mental reasons (e.g., “Josh will get upset and think Adam doesn’t like him
anymore”) in the first place, while younger children were more likely to think of situational
reasons (e.g., “The circus is fun”). Consequently, when older children were asked to explain
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an alternative perspective, the remaining alternative may have been a choice that is less
readily explained in mentalistic terms. It is unclear whether this is an artifact of the task or
whether even the oldest children in this study have difficulty setting aside salient situational
explanations for more mentalistic explanations when considering an alternative. Comparing
the performance of 5-year-olds and 9-year-olds with the performance of older children or
adults would help clarify this issue.
Older children also performed better on the composite score for the Social Dilemma
Task, and this effect held even when age and language were controlled for. The composite
score was based on the theoretical work of Bosacki (2000; Bosacki & Astington, 1999), who
argued that social understanding becomes increasingly complex and multidimensional. Thus,
borrowing from Chandler (1987, as cited in Bosacki, 2000), Bosacki included aspects of
empathetic sensitivity, conceptual role-taking or perspective taking, and person perception in
her conceptualization of advanced (or preadolescent) social understanding. In the current
study, the task was modified to make it more appropriate for younger children, but the results
add support to Bosacki’s position that children’s social understanding becomes increasingly
complex in both cognitive and affective domains and that social understanding in a
multidimensional construct. This finding is important because studies of advanced social
understanding tasks often have been developed without a theoretical basis, and have typically
focused on clinical populations, making it difficult to conceptualize the developmental
mechanisms that may explain performance. In particular, it is difficult to determine whether
age-related changes in performance are due to cognitive factors, such as perspective-taking or
executive functioning skills, or social factors such as social experience because it is unclear
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precisely why the more advanced social understanding tasks (e.g., Happé’s Strange Situation
Task) are more difficult than first- and second-order tasks.
Gender Differences
The second hypothesis was that girls would have an advantage over boys on the social
dilemma task but not the second-order task. While most studies do not report a gender
difference on the second-order belief tasks, several studies have reported a gender difference
favoring girls on more advanced social reasoning tasks (e.g., Banerjee, 1997; Bosacki, 2000;
Bosacki & Astington, 1999). In the current study no gender differences were observed on
either task. A gender effect is not always found in this literature. In the first-order literature,
Charman, Ruffman, and Clements (2002) have argued that gender differences are often not
observed due to small sample sizes. Small sample size may be an explanation for the lack of a
gender difference in the current study. However, a post hoc power analysis revealed that on
the basis of the effect size observed in the present study (d = .18, d = 11), an N of
approximately 1140 and 2835 participants would be needed to obtain statistical power at the
recommended .80 level (Cohen, 1988) on the Social Dilemma Task and the Second-Order
Belief Task, respectively. Therefore, the absence of significant gender differences in the
current study appears to reflect very small effect sizes for gender rather than the sample size
of the study. A second possibility is that the story used in the current study was not
appropriate for differentiating between boys and girls. Miller (2012) suggests that females
may have an advantage on social tasks due to different socialization experiences between
boys and girls. Thus, the social dilemma task may not have presented the necessary type of
social situation to elicit gender differences. Bosacki reported a gender difference using similar
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questions but a different story event. A challenge for a future study will be to determine
whether a gender difference can be found for different story events. However, in the current
study gender differences were not observed in children’s talk during the mother-child
conversations either. Thus it may be that gender differences reflect a weak effect that should
not be expected to occur reliably.
Mother and Child Conversations
Children’s Talk
The third hypothesis was that older children would produce more instances of talk
about the mind than younger children and older children would demonstrate more advanced
talk about the mind. These predictions were supported in the current study. Older children did
produce more instances of general talk about the mind and more instances of advanced talk
about the mind than younger children.
The age difference in children’s mentalistic talk is consistent with research on
children’s narratives of moral transgressions. Wainryb, Brehl, and Matwin (2005) asked
preschool, 1st-, 5th- and 10th-grade students to describe an event in which they were the victim
and an event in which they were the perpetrator. Student’s responses were then coded in terms
of the type of behavioral attributes, type of mental attributes, and narrative elements involved
in their narratives. Relevant to the current study, older children’s narratives contained more
references to mental states, emotions, and intentions. The types of mental states discussed
were also different. Preschool children’s narratives were dominated by references to beliefs
and desires while older children talked more about active forms of reasoning. For example,
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older children were more likely to refer to actively thinking about their thoughts (e.g., “I
thought about it and I thought maybe he was gonna take off without me.” pg. 47) and to
acknowledge that actions result from how things are perceived rather than how they really are
(e.g., I thought we were just joking around” pg. 47). Wainryb and colleagues argued that this
age difference in children’s narratives reflects a difference in how younger and older children
represent moral transgressions. Furthermore, they argued that the difference is not merely a
matter of young children having trouble taking on another person’s perspective. Rather,
young children had difficulty attributing thoughts and feelings to themselves as well as to
other others. In addition, younger children appeared to focus on the concrete behavioral
aspects of the events, whereas older children understood the importance of intentions, beliefs,
and emotions to interpersonal conflict. Thus, it would seem that as children develop they
become more aware of the importance of thinking about other people’s motivations, thoughts,
and emotions and begin to think about those aspects of mental life in more advanced ways.
In the current study, it was expected that older children would produce more instances
of mentalistic talk than younger children because older children had a more sophisticated
social understanding, and as such older children would expressed this social understand in
their representation and talk about the mind of others. One way to validate this premise is to
assess whether there is a relationship between children’s social understanding and their
mental talk. Do children with the most sophisticated social understanding have higher
instances of mental talk and more instances of advanced mentalistic talk than other children?
It was observed that neither measure of children’s social understanding was related to
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children’s basic mental talk (i.e., beliefs, desires, emotions, and personality traits), however
children’s social dilemma scores was related to children’s advanced mental talk.
Children’s advanced mental talk was related to children’s basic mental talk which
suggests that children with more advanced social understanding are thinking and talking about
others’ minds more than other children. However, only advanced mental talk was related to
more complex social understanding. Children’s advanced mental talk consisted of references
to advanced emotions (i.e., jealousy, hidden emotions, and mixed emotions), recursion or
relations among mental states and contrasting perspectives. This same kind of abstract and
complex mentalistic reasoning is assessed in the social dilemma task. Consequently, it was
expected that the two constructs would be related. In both the social dilemma task and the
mother child conversations, children were faced with hypothetical social events that involved
conflict between characters. In the social dilemma task children were asked to identify the
characters’ emotions, to describe a character, and to infer the characters’ perspectives. In the
mother child conversations the pair decided what was important to discuss and were free to
spend as much or as little time discussing the events as they wished. Thus, the present results
demonstrate that there is a relationship between children’s use of advanced social reasoning in
a structured task and in an unstructured task. This result also highlights the fact that children
are coming into these interactions with their own social competence and interests. The
primary goal of the current study was to explore how maternal language was related to
children’s language and social understanding, but it is likely that the relationship is
bidirectional. Mothers presumably respond to their child’s interests and social competence.
For example, Laible (2004) found that mothers who thought that their child had an easier
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temperament and was more attentive were more elaborative during a story task than mother
who thought that their child was more reactive (see also, Newton, Laible, Carlo, Steele, &
McGinley, 2014). In the current study, in some cases, children appear to drive the
conversation more than their mothers.
The fourth hypotheses was that girls would talk more about the mind and demonstrate
more advanced talk about the mind than would boys. This hypothesis was not supported.
Because gender differences are not a consistent finding in the literature, it is unclear how to
interpret this result. As previously discussed, it may be that the gender effect is small and
thus the current sample size was not sufficient to detect it. Again, post hoc power analyses
suggests that a very substantial increase in sample size would be needed to obtain an
appropriate level of statistical power with the current means. For example, on the basis of the
observed means for children’s advanced talk, the effect (d = .12) would require an increase of
2350 participants to obtain statistical power at .80. Alternatively, it may be an artifact of the
coding and scoring. That is, girls may talk about emotions more or have more elaborated
conversations about emotions than boys. In the present study children were given a present or
absent score for each story for which they mentioned emotions. A child that elaborated on
emotions at great length or made multiple mentions of different characters’ emotions in the
same story would have received the same score as a child who just briefly stated an emotion.
A different set of analyses would be needed to determine whether a gender difference is
present in this regard.
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Maternal Talk
The remaining four hypotheses each concern the relationship between maternal mental
talk and are each related to maternal talk and characteristics of children, including children’s
gender, age, social understanding, and children’s own production of mental talk. Examining
these relationships was the primary goal of the current study. Below I will briefly summarize
the results of each hypothesis and then discuss how these results relate to previous research on
parental language and children’s social understanding and socio-theories.
The fifth hypothesis was that mothers of older children would produce more basic
mental talk and more advanced mental talk than mothers of younger children. No age
difference was observed for maternal basic talk. Mothers of younger children talked about
beliefs, emotions, desires, and personality as much as mothers of older children. Mothers of
older children were however more likely to talk about advanced emotions, recursion and
related mental states, and contrasting perspective more than mothers of younger children.
Together, these results suggest that mothers may be responding to the child’s developmental
level. Research on children’s talk about the mind demonstrates that even very young children
talk about beliefs, desires, and emotions (e.g., Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). These topics seem
to be common in maternal speech and are not more frequent in conversations with older
children than younger children. Parents of older children do, however, discuss these topics in
more advanced ways by frequently using more advanced mental talk.
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The sixth hypothesis was that mothers of girls would talk more about the mind (i.e.,
basic mental talk) and produce more advanced talk than mothers of boys. As stated
previously, many researchers have suggested girls and boys experience different socialization
histories (e.g., Fivush, Brotman, Buckner, & Goodman, 2000; Kuebli, Butler, & Fivush,
1995). The results of this study did not support this hypothesis. However, as suggested
previously, this may be an artifact of how the construct of maternal talk was created. For
example, Fivush and colleagues (e.g., Fivush, 1991; Fivush, Berlin, Sales, MennutiWashburn, & Cassidy, 2003; Reese, Haden, & Fivush, 1993) have measured emotional talk in
terms of the number of elaborations that mothers produce and have found that mothers of girls
frequently elaborate more about negative emotions than do mothers of boys. Had this type of
coding been performed in the current study, a gender difference may have been observed.
This question remains to be answered in a future study. The nature of the story used in the
current study also may have effected how parents talk to their children. Personal stories about
the child or certain topics may elicit different kinds of talk by boys and girls. For example,
gender differences have been found in the kinds of themes that boys and girls talk about with
their parents. Parents tend to situate emotions in interpersonal relationships (e.g., losing a
friend) with their daughters and discuss emotions in autonomous situations (e.g., losing a toy)
more with their sons (Buckner & Fivush, 2000; Fivush, Brotman, Buckner, & Goodman,
2000). While the stories in the current study dealt with interpersonal relationships, the lack of
a gender difference may reflect the fact that all participants discussed the same events rather
than the participants choosing a personal event of their choice to discuss as done in Fivush’s
research.
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The seventh hypothesis was that maternal talk would be related to children’s social
understanding. This relation has been observed in the first order belief literature. In the
current study, maternal basic talk was correlated with children’s second-order false belief
scores when language was controlled for. However, when age and language were controlled
for, overall maternal language (ie., basic mental talk, advanced mental talk, and maternal
questions) was not a unique predictor of second-order false belief scores. Maternal advanced
talk was correlated with children’s social dilemma scores. Additionally, overall maternal
language was a unique predictor of children’s social dilemma scores above both child’s
language and age. In the first-order belief literature some researchers have argued that general
mental state language is related to children’s understanding of belief (Ruffman, Slade, &
Crowe, 2002) while others have disagreed with this claim and have argued that only explicit
reference to false belief and elaborations on beliefs by mothers were related to children’s
understanding of beliefs (Slaughter, Peterson, & Mackintosk, 2007). In the current study, only
advanced maternal language was correlated with children’s performance on the social
dilemma task and only mother’s basic mental talk was correlated with children’s performance
on the second-order false belief task. These results suggest that it may be the specific type of
information (i.e., conversational content) that children are exposed to that relates to their
social understanding. Again, while overall language was a unique predictor of children’s
social understanding it was maternal advanced talk that was correlated with children’s
performance on the social dilemma task. Mothers who talk more about advanced emotions,
contrasting perspectives, and related mental states have children who are more likely to
represent and talk about these aspects when thinking about interpersonal conflict. Simply
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attending to beliefs, desires, and basic emotions may not be enough to move children into
reasoning about complex social reasoning. Instead, mothers may facilitate children’s social
reasoning by responding to subtle aspects of children’s social understanding.
The eighth hypothesis was that maternal mentalistic talk would be related to children’s
mentalistic talk. This hypothesis was supported. Children who talked more about the mind
had mothers who also talked more about the mind, and children who talked in more advanced
ways about the mind had mothers who talked in more advanced ways about the mind.
However, when age and language were controlled for, overall maternal language was not a
unique predictor of children’s basic talk. Overall maternal language was, however, a unique
predictor of children’s advanced talk above children’s age and language. Because mental talk
of both mother and child were taken during their conversation it is impossible to say whether
mothers are promoting children’s mentalistic talk. Likely the influence is bidirectional. That
is, children were likely responding to their mother’s conversations and mothers were likely
tailoring the conversation to their child’s interest. However, Harris (2005) points to several
pieces of evidence that suggests that mother’s mental language makes a unique contribution to
children’s social understanding. First, children’s early theory of mind performance does not
predict mother’s later mental language. Second, mother’s mental language correlates with
children’s emotional understanding even when researchers measure mother’s mental language
in a separate interview and control for maternal sensitivity (i.e., attachment), education, and
SES.
Neither maternal questions about emotions nor questions about mental content (e.g.,
desire, beliefs) were, by themselves, related to either children’s advanced social
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understanding or children’s mental talk. However, in the regression model, emotion questions
were a significant predictor of children’s advanced social understanding. Several studies have
found that maternal questions were related to children’s first-order belief understanding (see
Wellman & Lagattuta, 2004). Questions have been suggested to be important because they
draw children’s attention to important aspects of a situation and allow children the explicit
opportunity to explain behaviors in their own words. An effect for mental maternal questions
may not have been observed in the current study because they were relatively frequent and
thus may not vary much across individuals. This may have been an effect of the tasks since
parents were asked to discuss the event, to think about what would happen next in the event,
and to think about the event from their child’s perspective. Thus, this may not reflect
variations that may exist when parents and children talk about these kinds of situations. There
was a significant difference between parents of younger and older children in terms of mental
questions. Mental questions were more commonly used by mothers of younger children.
However, this effect disappeared when child’s language was controlled for.
It may be that in middle childhood, children benefit from questions that draw their
attention to more complex mentalistic events rather than questions that only draw their
attention to basic emotions or beliefs. A future study could separate different types of
questions. There may be a difference between asking how someone feels (e.g., “How does
Brian feel?”), asking for an elaboration (“Why does Brian feel jealous?”) and asking someone
to empathize (“How would you feel in this situation”).
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Summary
In summary, during middle childhood children make gains in their social
understanding. Specifically they begin to think about other people’s thoughts, intentions, and
beliefs in more complex ways. That is, children are attending to people’s thoughts, realizing
that people often have mixed feelings, people are motivated by jealousy, people’s actions are
related to how they construe the situation which may be different from how others construe a
situation, and people’s thoughts and emotions are tied to their own and other peoples’
thoughts and emotions. These social cognitive advances are evident in the way children
represent and talk about social conflicts. The age changes in social understanding that were
found in the current study add to a growing consensus that during middle childhood social
understanding develops beyond first-order and second-order belief competence and includes
understanding of other aspects of psychological functioning beyond understanding beliefs
(Carpendale & Lewis, 2006; Devine & Hughes, 2014; Miller, 2012).
The current study is in line with Carpendale and Lewis position that children’s
development of social understanding demonstrates a level of gradualism. Whereas theorists
from the the theory theory perspective have argued for a few grand conceptual shifts (e.g.,
representing false beliefs) in children’s social understanding, Carpendale and Lewis argue that
children’s social understanding is acquired gradually through social engagements and that a
mature social understanding continues to emerge from social interactions throughout late
childhood and adolescence. At present, there has been limited research in this area with older
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children in adolescents, but the effect of conversational experience on advanced theory of
mind tasks (i.e., second-order beliefs and sarcasm) has been shown in a recent study with
native and non-native signers ( (O'Reilly, Peterson, & Wellman, 2014). Both groups of deaf
children (native and non-native signers) performed worse than similar aged hearing children.
However, by adulthood native signers had caught up to hearing adults while non-native
signers had not. Experience in bilingual schools, as opposed to oral-only schools, and having
a job that frequently used language were related to better theory of mind performance. This
result shows that conversational exposure in adolescence and adulthood continues to benefits
theory of mind development.
Carpendale’s and Lewis’ position is similar to Miller’s (2012) proposal that much of
the development of social understanding during middle childhood involves quantitative
change rather than qualitative change. That is, “as children grow older, thoughts about
people, whether others or the self, become more differentiated, more integrated, more
multifaceted, and more accurate” (pg. 200). Mother’s talk may not but the impetus for
conceptual change among older children, but instead may be a guide for what children attend
to and how they organize social information. This type of conversational scaffolding may
help children make connections among different mental states, apply their social knowledge
to new situations, understand the consequences of mental thought, and understand relations
between mental states and actions, and recognize more subtle mental states (e.g., pride, guilt,
embarrassment).
The current study supports the hypotheses that parental language is one factor
influencing the developmental change in children’s social understanding. Mothers and
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children talked about the mind in related ways and maternal language was a unique predictor
of children’s social reasoning. This finding builds on the first-order belief literature that has
demonstrated a clear relationship between maternal language and children’s social
understanding (e.g., Brown, Donnelan-McCall, & Dunn, 1996; Brown & Dunn, 1991; Dunn,
1994, 1995, 1996; Dunn & Hughes, 1998; Hughes & Cutting, 1999).
Why should maternal language be related to children’s social understanding? The
current study was influenced by the socio-cultural perspective of children’s social cognitive
development. Specifically, the current study was motivated by the hypothesis that children’s
social understanding develops out of children’s interaction with the social world. When
children interact with more competent members of their social community they are exposed to
multiple aspects of the social environment and are implicitly taught how to represent and
respond to the social world. These interactions become internalized by the child and direct
children’s attention, cognition, and communication (e.g., Fernyhough, 2008; Nelson, 1996;
Rogoff, 1990). Although the concurrent associations found in the current study are not
sufficient to argue that maternal language is causally related to children’s social
understanding, this study is the first to show that maternal mental state language is at least
related to children’s social understanding in middle childhood.
Because the relationship between mother-child discourse and children’s social
understanding is likely to be bidirectional, it is important to consider a range of characteristics
of both mothers and children that may be influential. For example, a child’s temperament
might influence the quality and topics of parent-child discourse which in turn influence what
the child learns about ahimself and his social understanding which in turn impcts his response
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to the world. Some support for this idea that children’s temperament can influence social
opportunities comes from the emotional reactivity hypothesis (Hare & Tomasello, 2005;
Lane, Wellman, Olson, Miller, & Wang, 2013; Wellman, Lane, LaBounty, & Olson, 2011).
The theory was developed to explain why some animals demonstrate social cognitive ability
that are on par with infants’ social cognitive abilities (e.g., gaze following, awareness of
pointing). Hare and Tomasello proposed that some animals may have had particular
temperaments (e.g., non-aggressive) that allowed them more access to humans and led to
domestication. In turn, dogs acquired more human like social cognitive awareness. Wellman
and colleagues (Lane et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 2011) have found support for a relationship
between temperament and theory of mind in younger children. In these studies aggression was
negatively correlated with theory of mind performance and shy-withdrawal and greater
physiological reactivity were positively related to theory of mind performance. The positive
correlation between both shy-withdrawal and theory of mind performance and moderate
physiological reactivity and theory of mind performance was thought to be the result of
children who were more observant and attentive to social stimuli (e.g.,’sometimes prefers to
watch rather than join other children playing’) and thus able to learn more about others.
Executive functioning is another child characteristic that has been shown to influence
children’s social understanding in the first-order literature (e.g., Carlson, Moses, & Claxton,
2004). Among older children and adolescents executive functioning may be related to
children’s ability to hold attention during conversations, alter their strategies during
negotiations, and use knowledge of others to plan social behaviors (Landry, Smith, & Swank,
2009). While traditional theories have focused on genetic and biological roots of executive
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function, current research has shown that parental scaffolding, culture, maternal
characteristics, and home environment affect the development of executive functioning in
children (Bibok, Carpendale, & Muller, 2009; Landry, Smith, & Swank, 2009; Lewis,
Koyasu, Oh, Ogawa, Short, & Huang, 2009). For example, Bernier, Carlson, and Whipple
(2010) assessed maternal sensitivity, maternal mind-mindedness, autonomy-suppport (i.e.,
scaffolding) at 12 and 15 months and children’s executive functioning at 18 and 26 months.
All maternal variables were related to later executive functioning, but maternal mindmindedness and autonomy-support made unique contributions to children’s executive
functioning.
It is important to mention that, some theorists have proposed that executive function
influences the development of social understanding, but others argue that improved social
understanding influences the development of executive function (see Perner, Lang, Kloo,
2002, for a review of these positons). Conceivably, the relation between executive function
and social understanding may be bidirectional. Moreover, social experiences may contribute
to the development of executive function. For example, Fernyhough (2010), from a sociocultural perspective, has argued that while the development of executive functioning has been
viewed as a process of biological maturation, this reductionist view is incorrect. Rather,
biology, culture, and social engagement are involved in the development of both executive
function and social understanding. As such, social processes may mediate the development
of both executive function and social understanding, and it may be impossible to separate the
influence of social engagement from either one of these abilities.
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Additionally, attachment may influence the nature of conversations between parents
and children and thus, indirectly influence children’s social understanding. LaBounty and
colleagues (2008) found that stories involving negative emotions are more likely to evoke talk
about the mind than stories involving positive emotions. Thus, involvement in conversations
about negative emotions may provide children with more exposure to psychological talk.
Laible (2010) observed that a warm family climate and attachment were both related to the
frequency of talk about emotions and elaborations on emotions about negative events between
mothers and their preschool aged child. The conversations were also related to children’s
emotional and relationship understanding. Laible proposed that when children have strong
attachments and a close family relationship it is easier for parents to have constructive talks
about emotions. This line of research, along with the research on temperament and executive
functioning illustrates the dynamic and complex relationship between maternal
characteristics, child characteristics, and social understanding.
Limitations of Current Study
Limitations of Measures
Results of the Second-order Belief tasks and the Social Dilemma task suggest that they
are meaningful measures of social understanding. Age differences were reported on both
measures. Inter-rater reliability was obtained on both measures. The significant correlations
between questions on the Social Dilemma tasks suggest that social understanding is a
multifaceted construct. That is, children who perform well on this task do so by
demonstrating higher reasoning in regards to empathetic sensitivity, perspective taking, and
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person perception. The correlation between the social dilemma and children’s talk about
social events suggests that the social dilemma task measures some aspect of social
competence. However, an important step for the field is to validate these measures against
standardized measures. Examples of standardized measures for children this age include
Reading the Mind in the Eye Test (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997) and
Happe’s Strange Stories (Happe, 1994). Standardized tasks that could be adopted for children
include the Ambiguous Intentions Hostility Questionnaire (Combs, Penn, Wicherm, &
Waldheter, 2007), The Awareness of Social Inference Test (McDonald, Flanagan, Rollins, &
Kinch, 2003), and the Half Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (Ambady, Hallahan, & Rosenthal,
1995) to name a few. These measures would need to be validated for children but would be
useful since they assess multiple domains of social cognition including, attribution style,
emotional recognition, and social perception (Pinkham, Penn, Green, Buck, Healey, &
Harvey, 2013).
Limitations of Conversational Data
As children develop, their increasingly sophisticated language and cognitive skills aid
their social understanding and supports more advanced talk about this mind. However, it can
also make it challenging to reliably code children’s conversations in order to capture this
complex social understanding. This challenge has even been raised in the first order literature
(e.g., Carpendale & Lewis, 2004). For example, one problem with simply coding mental
terms is that people can talk about the mind without using mental state terms and people can
use mental state terms “conversationally” and not be referring to actual mental states. For
example, the phrase “I don’t know” can mean “I don’t have a response” or signal frustration
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or disinterest in a conversation rather than referring to the content of someone’s mind.
Another critique has been whether young children have the same meaning in their mental
state terms as adults. With older children that may be less of a concern, but they may be more
likely to rely on their shared histories or common ground and leave out the explicit mention of
mental terms. This may explain why most of the older children did not explicitly refer to a
mental state when asked “why does John think Mary went to the park?” in the second-order
belief task even though their responses demonstrate an awareness of John’s knowledge. It is
also possible that the coding scheme is not sensitive enough to capture the full extent of the
child’s social understanding. For example, some children and parents often used idioms,
proverbs, and sayings in their conversations. These elements of language can be used to
convey very complex ideas of social understanding much more briefly. For example, when
one mother says, “she stuck her foot in her mouth”, referring to a character who doesn’t know
her friend painted a picture and calls it ugly, she demonstrates some awareness that the
character said something she should not have said. This mother also demonstrated that the
character’s actions were likely unintentional because she didn’t know it was her friend’s
painting, and suggests some level of embarrassment or awkwardness for each character.
Several complex ideas are at the core of these sayings.
Additionally, by exclusively coding for instances of specific mental talk (e.g., desires,
emotions, beliefs), the coding categories miss other aspects of social understanding. For
example, moral issues were commonly discussed and parents likely invest a lot of time talking
to their older children about these issues. The coding scheme was also not sensitive to the
entire depths of the conversation. In the current study, instances of mental talk were counted
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as present or absent for each story. Thus, this coding scheme was sensitive to whether
participants discussed thoughts, emotions, and so on across multiple stories or whether
participants had multiple instances of mental talk within a story. However, the current coding
scheme is insensitive to how much elaboration went on in these conversations. For example,
some mothers spent a great amount of time talking about both the character’s perspective and
the how the child might react in the same situation, using examples from past events and
family members. These types of elaborations and storytelling may be particularly important
for helping children develop empathy and perspective taking. For example, narrative theorists
argue that our understanding of ourselves and of others occur through our ability to
understand and tell stories (Bruner, 1986). Bruner, argues that social understanding emerges
from our negotiations with other, not solely from our exposure to events or exemplars. This
suggests that variations in parents’ conversations with children may lead to interesting
variations in children’s thoughts about others’ behaviors, feelings, and thoughts.
Finally, measuring maternal talk and children’s talk during the same conversation
limits the interpretation of the results, since there is a bidirectional influence between the two
participants. During conversations, mothers dominated the conversation in terms of number of
words. Arguable it could be that mothers influence the content of the conversation by
directing children to certain features of the story, highlighting the importance of different
people’s perspectives, modeling ways of thinking and talking about others, and scaffolding
children’s understanding of the stories. From this perspective, mothers likely had a direct
influence on children’s social cognition. However, that model would ignore the fact that
children choose what to attend to, encode, and remember. A child who is interested in others’
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minds may ask more questions and give replies that encourage mothers to discuss others in
more elaborate ways. An uninterested child might repeatedly say “I don’t know” or give brief
answers that some mothers redirect and other mothers give into. Children also bring into the
discussion their own ideas, orienting the conversation to topics that suit their interests. From
this perspective, children have direct influence on their social cognitive development. This
however, this model ignores the mother’s role. A better model looks at the bidirectional
relationship between conversational partners. According to Rogoff:
All participants are active: no one has all the responsibility and no one is passive.
Children take an active role in managing their own learning, coordinating with adults
who are also contributing to the direction of the activity, while they provide the
children with guidance and orientation. (And the children sometimes do likewise for
the adults.) Adults support children’s learning and development through attention to
what the children are ready for and interested in as they engage in shared activities in
which all contributions (Rogoff, Matusov, & White, 1996, p. 396)
Therefore, the contributions of each conversational partner are difficult to separate. One way
to resolve some of this issue would be to measure maternal talk separate from the child to
determine if they are related. Additionally, a longitudinal study would allow researchers to
control for prior use of mental state language and theory of mind performance, thus allowing
the researcher to separate the contributions of each.
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Future Direction
This study investigated the relationship between maternal talk and children’s social
understanding in middle childhood. However, the first-order literature has also demonstrated
a relationship between children’s social reasoning and siblings, peers, extended family
members, and fathers ( (Brown, Donelan-McCall, & Dunn, 1996; Lewis, Freeman,
Kyriakidou, & Berridge, 1996; Peterson, 2000; LaBounty, Wellman, Olson, Lagattuta, & Liu,
2008). Future research should investigate these relationships in middle childhood as they may
make unique contributions to children’s social understanding in middle childhood. For
example, LaBounty and colleagues looked at both mothers’ and fathers’ discourse and found
that maternal discourse was related to children’s concurrent emotional understanding and that
certain aspects of fathers’ discourse was related to children’s concurrent and later theory of
mind. Looking at fathers’ contribution may be particularly interesting because they have been
somewhat overlooked in the developmental literature. As this changes there continues to be
some surprising results. For example, Pancsofar and Vernon-Feagans (2006) observed mother
and fathers interacting with their young children and found that in homes with two working
parents only father’s language was a unique predictor of children’s language at age 3. What is
interesting is the authors’ explanation for this result. They suggest that fathers may be less
attuned to their child’s developmental level and thus they may use more advanced and diverse
vocabulary with their children. Additionally, they suggest that children may view the
interaction with their fathers as more novel and thus pay more attention to these events. If
either one of these hypotheses is true it could have implications for other kinds of
conversations that fathers have with their children. Particularly, if fathers talk about internal
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states or interpersonal conflicts these conversations may be more advanced or they may be
more salient to the child.
Other variables that have been related to children’s social understanding in younger
children include SES, parenting style, and parents’ tendency to think about children in
mentalistic terms (i.e., mind-mindedness) (e.g., (Meins E. , Fernyhough, Wainwright, Guspta,
Fradley, & Tuckey, 2002; Pears & Moses, 2003). Future research should explore whether
these relationships continue in middle childhood. One reason for looking at the variable mindmindedness in particular would be to investigate individual differences between mothers in
order to explain why some mothers talk about the mind more than others. A longitudinal
study would be needed to determine whether mothers who talk more about the mind when
their children are young are also the mothers who talk about the mind in more advanced way
when their children are older, but this study did find that mothers who talk about the mind in
basic ways also concurrently talk in more advanced ways. These individual differences may
be related to how attuned mothers are to their child’s mind (i.e., mind-mindedness).

Since

research has demonstrated that mind-mindedness predicts young children’s A future direction
would be to explore this possibility.
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SECOND-ORDER FALSE BELIEF TASK: STORY AND PICTURES

134

John and Mary are together in the park in the morning (see Figure 1). Mary would like
to buy ice cream from the man selling it there, but she has left her money at home. “Don’t be
sad,” says the ice-cream man, “you can fetch your money and buy some ice cream later. I’ll
be here in the park in the afternoon too.” “Oh good,” Mary says, “I’ll come back this
afternoon then” (see Figure 2). After Mary has left, John notices the ice-cream man leaving
the park with his cart. “I’m going to take my cart to the church,” the ice-cream man tells John,
“There is no one in the park to buy ice cream” (see Figure 3). As the ice-cream man rides over
to the church he passes by Mary’s house. Mary is in her yard when she spots the ice cream
man. “Hello, Mary!” the ice-cream man waves, “I’m heading over to the church; hopefully
I’ll be able to sell more ice cream there.” Mary says, “It’s a good thing I saw you, I’ll meet
you there this afternoon” (see Figure 4). Now John doesn’t know that Mary talked to the icecream man. He doesn’t know that.
.After lunch John heads over to Mary’s house, but she is not home. “She’s just left to buy ice
cream,” Mary’s mother says (see Figure 5).
Reality Question: Where has Mary gone to buy her ice cream?
Forced Choice: Has Mary gone to the Church or the Park to buy her ice cream?
Memory Question: Where was the ice cream cart in the morning?
Forced Choice: Was the ice cream cart at the Park or the Church in the morning?
Test Question: Where does John think Mary has gone?
Forced Choice: Does John think Mary has gone to the church or the park?
Justification: Why does John think Mary is there?

Figure 1
John and Mary at the Park

Figure 2
John and Mary talking to the Ice Cream Man
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Figure 3
John talking to the Ice Cream Man

Figure 4
Mary talking to the Ice Cream Man
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Figure 5
John in front of Mary's House

APPENDIX B
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This is Kathy [Robert]. This is Erica [Eric]. This is Debby [Josh] (see Figures 6 and
7). Kathy [Robert] has been asked by a new child in town to go to a special event that
unfortunately conflicts with a previously settled plan with a long-time friend of Kathy's
[Robert’s].
Kathy [Robert] has been asked by the new girl [boy], Erica [Eric] to go to an ice
skating show with her [him] the next afternoon, and this conflicts with a date with Kathy's
[Robert’s] best friend, Debby [Josh], to work on a play house. In addition, the old friend,
Debby [Josh], does not like the new girl [boy].”
Comprehension:
Can you tell me what happened in the story?
What do you think Kathy should do? Should she go to the ice show with Erica or plan a
puppet show with Debby?
Role Taking Questions: (0-3)
Why do you think Kathy should do ______________?
Are there any other reasons why Kathy should do__________?
Alternative Thinking Question: (0-3)
Can you think of any reasons why Kathy should do ___________? (Opposite action)
Empathy questions: (0-3)
If Kathy goes to the ice show with Erica how will Debby feel? Why?
If Kathy decides to work on a play house with Debby how will Erica feel? Why?
Person Perception: (0-3)
Choose a character in this story and describe them.
What kind of things can you think of to describe her? What kind of person do you
think she is?
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Figure 6
Female Characters

Figure 7
Male Characters
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Mother-Child Conversation Script

142

Experimenter: Here are four short stories. We will give you all the stories at once but you
should only work on one story at a time. We would like your mom to read each story to you
and afterwards we would like you and your mom to discuss the story. You can talk about the
stories in any way {emphasis added} you want. At the end of each story there are always two
questions. You can talk about these questions but you can talk about other things too. Think
about how you might talk about these stories at home.

When you have talked about everything {emphasis added} you want to talk about. Then you
and your mom can go on to the next story. When you are all done, you can open the door and
I will come back in.

MOTHER-CHILD CONVERSATIONS AND SCRIPT
Female Version of Soccer Story
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This is Jessica.

This is Ashley.

Jessica and Ashley are Best friends.
Both of the girls like to play soccer, but when they play together Jessica always wins.
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One day after the girls play, Ashley says, “I won’t ever play soccer with you again. I never
win. It is no fun to always lose.”
Jessica replies, “But we both like to play soccer. How will we get better if we don’t practice?”
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Jessica

What do you think will happen next?
What would have happened if this event happened to you?

Ashley

MOTHER-CHILD CONVERSATIONS AND SCRIPT
Male Version of Soccer Story
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This is James.

This is Adam.

James and Adam are best friends.
Both of the boys like to play soccer, but when they play together James always wins.
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One day after the boys play, Adam says, “I won’t ever play soccer with you again. I never win. It is no
fun to always lose.”
James replies, “But we both like to play soccer. How will we get better if we don’t practice?”
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James
What do you think will happen next?
What would happen if this event happened to you?

Adam

MOTHER-CHILD CONVERSATIONS AND SCRIPT
Female Version of Art Story
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This is Nicole.

This is Katie.

Nicole spent all week working on a picture for the school’s art show.
On Friday night friends and family were invited to come view the school’s work.
Nicole invited her friend Katie from another school.
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When they arrived, Nicole said, “Let’s go look at the paintings. Everybody worked really hard
on them.
When they are in front of Nicole’s picture, Katie says, “who painted this picture? This
painting is really ugly.”

154

Nicole
What do you think will happen next?
What would happen if this event happened to you?

Katie

MOTHER-CHILD CONVERSATIONS AND SCRIPT
Male Version of Art Story
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This is Nick.

This is Kevin

Nick spent all week working on a picture for the school’s art show.
On Friday night friends and family were invited to come view the students’ work.
Nick invited his friends Kevin from another school.
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When they arrived, Nick said, “Let’s go look at the painting. Everybody worked really hard
on them.
When they are in front of Nick’s picture, Kevin says, “Who painted this picture? This painting
is really ugly.”
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Nick
What do you think will happen next?
What would happen if this event happened to you?

Kevin

MOTHER-CHILD CONVERSATIONS AND SCRIPT
Female Version of Writing Contest Story
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This is Megan.

This is Gloria.

Megan and Gloria are best friends.
Both Megan and Gloria write stories to enter into the writing contest at school.
When the winner is announced Megan wins.

This is Libby.
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Afterwards, Gloria stops talking to Megan and begins hanging out with Libby.
Gloria and Megan have not talked all week and Megan has been alone.
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Megan

Gloria

What do you think will happen next?
What would happen if this event happened to you?

Libby

MOTHER-CHILD CONVERSATIONS AND SCRIPT
Male Version of Writing Contest Story
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This is Mike.

This is Greg.

This is Lance.

Mike and Greg are best friends.
Both Mike and Greg write stories to enter into the writing contest at school.
When the winner is announced Mike wins.
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Afterwards, Greg stops talking to Mike and begins hanging out with Lance.
Greg and Mike have not talked all week and Mike has been alone.
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Mike

Greg

What do you think will happen next?
What would happen if this event happened to you?

Lance

MOTHER-CHILD CONVERSATIONS AND SCRIPT
Female Version of Sleepover Story

168

This is Rachel.

This is Rachel’s mom.

This is Jenny.

Rachel has been sick all week.
She has not been able to go to school.
However, she feels a little better each day and by Friday she feels pretty good, but she still
stays home from school.
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On Friday there is a sleepover at Jenny’s house.
It is Jenny’s birthday and Rachel is her best friend.
Rachel really wants to go. Jenny wanted all her friends to come.
However, Rachel’s mom says no. She thinks Rachel is still sick and needs to rest so she will
be better for school on Monday
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Rachel

Rachel’s mom

What do you think will happen next?
What would happen if this event happened to you?

Jenny

MOTHER-CHILD CONVERSATIONS AND SCRIPT
Male Version of Sleepover Story
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This is Richard.

This is Richard’s mom.

This is Jimmy.

Richard has been sick all week.
He has not been able to go to school.
However, he feels a little better each day and by Friday he feels pretty good, but he still stays
home from school.
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On Friday there is a sleepover at Jimmy’s house.
It is Jimmy’s birthday and Richard is his best friend.
Richard really wants to go and Jimmy wants all his friends to come.
However, Richard’s mom says no. She thinks Richard is still sick and needs to rest so he will
be better for school on Monday.
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Richard

Richard’s mom

What do you think will happen next?
What would happen if this event happened to you?

Jimmy
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176

Dear Parent,
Your child is invited to participate in a study titled “Social Minds: Mother- Child
Conversations in Middle Childhood”. This study is being conducted by RaeAnne Pearson as part of a
Doctoral Dissertation in psychology at Northern Illinois University under the direction of Bradford H.
Pillow. The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand how children think about other
people and how children learn about other people. One way that children may learn about other
people is through conversations with their parents. The current study investigates the relationship
between children’s understanding of other people and maternal language.
You and your child will participate for approximately 1 hour. There will be several tasks that
your child will be asked to participate in. First, your child’s language understanding will be assessed.
For example, your child will be shown four pictures and will be asked to point to the correct picture
(e.g., “can you point to the girl laughing?”). This is not a clinical assessment of your child’s language
development. This is a research tool designed to capture your child’s general language
understanding. Second, your child will listen to a short story about a child who is conflicted about
which activity to participate in. Your child will be asked about how the character should decide which
event to attend and how the characters in the story will feel. Third, your child will listen to a short
story about two characters’ activities. Your child will be asked about events in the story and how the
characters acted.
Finally, your child will be asked to participate in four short conversations with you. We will
supply you with four short scenarios involving social situations with other children. For example, in
one story the main character’s best friend is spending a lot of time with a new friend and leaving the
main character out. We will ask you to discuss this situation just like you would at home.
During this research study you and your child will discuss scenarios that involve conflict
between peers. The conversational stories used in this experiment were designed to elicit
conversation that would typically occur between you and your child. The stories were also designed
to be similar to situations that your child may experience. However, talking about conflicts could
involve some distress. If your child feels uncomfortable at any point in this experiment he or she can
discontinue participation or skip over any questions. There is no penalty associated with any of these
actions and an experimenter will be available if you wish to stop the procedure at any time. Your
child’s participation in this study is entirely voluntary. Even in the event that your child decides not to
participate or wishes to withdraw from the study you will still receive $15 in compensation for your
time.
There is no direct benefit from participation in this study, but your child’s participation may
help us better understand the development of social understanding in middle childhood and how
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parents contribute to their child’s social understanding. There is no direct benefit to your child for
participating.
Finally, please note that the individual information that you supply will not be shared with
anyone outside the research team. More precisely, no one outside the research team will see any
part of the cassette records of your conversations with your child or your child’s responses. In
addition, your child’s name and personal information will be kept separate from this data.
If you have any questions about this study, you may call or email RaeAnne M Pearson at
(815) 753-7259 (rpearson@niu.edu) or Bradford H Pillow at (815) 753-7079. This project has been
reviewed and approved by Northern Illinois University Review Board. If you have any questions about
your child’s rights as a research participant, you may call the NIU Office of Research Compliance at
(815)753-8588.

I have read the above information. I understand my child’s rights as a participant in this study and
any questions I had regarding this study have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to my child
participating in this study.

Name : ___________________________, Date:_____________________________
Signature:_____________________________

AUDIO Consent
I understand that part of my child’s participation in this study will be audio recorded. I understand
that this information will only be seen by the researchers of this project. I agree to be audio taped.
Name : ___________________________, Date:_____________________________
Signature:_____________________________

CONSENT FORMS AND RECRUITMENT MATERIAL
Adult consent form
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Dear Participant,
You are being invited to participate in a study titled “Social Minds: Mother- Child Conversations in
Middle Childhood”. This study is being conducted by RaeAnne Pearson as part of a Doctoral
Dissertation in psychology at Northern Illinois University under the direction of Bradford H. Pillow.
The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand how children think about other people and
how children learn about other people. One way that children may learn about other people is
through conversations with their parents. The current study investigates the relationship between
children’s understanding of other people and maternal language.
You and your child will participate for approximately 1 hour. There will be several
questionnaires that we will ask you to complete. First, you will be asked to fill out a short
questionnaire about your age, income, number of children, and education. Second, you will be asked
to complete a questionnaire on your child’s social behavior (e.g., how well he or she makes friends).
Third, you will be asked to describe your response to five hypothetical disciplinary situations. Fourth,
you will be asked to describe your child.
Finally, you will be asked to participate in four brief conversations with your children. We will
supply you with four short scenarios involving social situations with other children. For example, in
one story the main character’s best friend is spending a lot of time with a new friend and leaving the
main character out. We will ask you to discuss this situation just like you would at home.
Some of the questionnaires you will complete may cover personal information that some
participates may feel uncomfortable sharing. For example, some participants may be uncomfortable
responding to hypothetical parenting scenarios. In addition, you will be asked to discuss four short
scenarios with your child. These scenarios are about conflicts between young friends and were
designed to be similar to the types of situations that children may experience. Talking about
parenting practices or conflicts could involve some distress. If you feel uncomfortable at any point in
this experiment you can discontinue your participation or skip over any questions. There is no
penalty associated with any of these actions and an experimenter will be available if you wish to stop
the procedure at any time. Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary.
There is no direct benefit from participation in this study, but your participation may help us
better understand the development of social understanding in middle childhood and how parents
contribute to their child’s social understanding. While there is no incentive for participating in this
study, you will be given $15 as compensation for your time and travel expenses. You will receive this
compensation regardless of whether you or your child completes this study.
Finally, please note that the individual information that you supply will not be shared with
anyone outside the research team. That is, no one outside the research team will see any part of the
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cassette records of your conversations or your responses to questionnaires or interviews. In addition,
your name and personal information will be kept separate from this data.
If you have any questions about this study after you participate, you may call or email
RaeAnne M Pearson at (815) 753-7259 (rpearson@niu.edu) or Bradford H Pillow at (815) 753-7079.
This project has been reviewed and approved by Northern Illinois University Review Board. If you
have any questions about your child’s rights as a research participant, you may call the NIU Office of
Research Compliance at (815)753-8588.

I have read the above information. I understand my rights as a participant in this study and any
questions I had regarding this study have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in
this study.

Name : ___________________________, Date:_____________________________
Signature:_____________________________

AUDIO Consent
I understand that part of my participant in this study will be audio recorded. I understand that this
information will only be seen by the researchers of this project. I agree to be audio taped.
Name : ___________________________, Date:_____________________________
Signature:_____________________________

CONSENT FORMS AND RECRUITMENT MATERIAL
Assent Script: Younger Children
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YOUNGER CHILDREN (5-6)
Hello [child’s name]
I am a researcher and I am interested in how children think and how they talk to their mom. There
are two things I would like your help with. First, I would like you to come with me and I will ask you
some questions. I will say something and I will ask you to pick a picture that goes with what I said. Do
you think that would be okay?
Circle the child’s response:

YES

NO

Okay. Great.
Then I will read you two stories about some kids and ask you some questions about what you think
about the stories. Do you think that would be okay?
Circle the child’s response:

YES

NO

Okay. Great.

The second thing I would like you to do is to come and talk to your mom. Your mom will read you
some stories and all you have to do is talk with her. Do you think that would be okay?
Circle the child’s response:

YES

NO

Okay. Great.

Now when you are talking to your mom I will not be in the room. Would it be okay if I record what
you say so I can learn about how children talk to their mom?
Circle the child’s response:

YES

NO

Okay. Great.

I think you will have fun, however, if you don’t want to answer a question or talk about something
you can tell me and we can stop. You will not get in any trouble if you decide to stop. Does that
sound okay?
Circle the child’s response:

YES

NO

CONSENT FORMS AND RECRUITMENT MATERIAL
Assent Script: Older Children

OLDER CHILDREN (8-10)
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The following will be read to the child
Dear Participant,
You have been invited to help in a study. The study is being done by RaeAnne Pearson. We
are interested in how children think and how they talk to their mom.
During this study you will be asked to do several tasks so that we can better understand
children. First you will go with one of the researchers and do three things. First, you and the
researcher will complete a language task. The researcher will say some sentences and all you have to
do is point to the picture that you think goes with the sentence. Next, the researcher wants to see
what you think about some stories. The researcher will read you two stories about some children.
After each story the researcher will ask you some questions about what the children should do in the
story.
After you do those tasks then your mom will come in and you and her will discuss some other
stories. Your mom will read the stories and you and her will talk about them just like you would at
home.
We only want you to participate if you want to participate. Also, if you agree to participate
now that does not mean that you have to answer all the questions. If you do not feel comfortable
answering a question that is okay. We can stop at anytime and you can decide when. You wil not get
in any trouble if you decide to stop.

I agree to participate,
______________________________
AUDIO Recording
So that we can look at what you and your mom talked about later, we will be recording what you talk
about with your mom.
I agree to be audio recorded,

________________________________

CONSENT FORMS AND RECRUITMENT MATERIAL
Community Flyer
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CONSENT FORMS AND RECRUITMENT MATERIAL
Letter to Principal

Dear Principal,
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I am writing to inform you of a study being conducted by the Cognitive Development Lab at
Northern Illinois University titled “Social Minds: Mother-Child Conversations”. The study is being
conducted by myself, RaeAnne Pearson, as part of my dissertation under the direction of Bradford
Pillow.
The purpose of this study is to document age differences in mother-child conversations
about interpersonal relationships and to investigate how mother-child conversations are related to
children’s social understanding. Specifically, I am interested in mother-child conversations and social
understanding during middle childhood. Research in this area has commonly focused either on early
childhood (e.g., preschool age) or adolescence (i.e., high school age). As a result, little is known
about mother-child conversations during middle childhood (i.e., elementary school age). During
middle childhood social understanding improves and children’s social world becomes more complex.
Therefore, this research has potential implications for children’s peer relationships and children’s
emerging social understanding.
To complete this research I rely on mothers and children to participate. I am currently in the
process of trying to recruit participants by posting flyers in the community and contacting schools.
Within the next few days I will contact you to inquire about the possibility of placing a flyer in your
school or sending flyers home with students.
I have included an example of my flyer with this letter. If you have questions about this study
you can contact me at 815-753-7259 or Bradford Pillow at 815-753-7079. You can also visit the study
website at childdevelopmentlab.weebly.com. This research has been approved by the Institutional
Review Board. If you have any questions about the rights of the participants in this study please
contact the NIU Office of Research Compliance at 815-753-8588.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
RaeAnne Pearson

CONSENT FORMS AND RECRUITMENT MATERIAL
School Flyer
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